Hezbollah and the Future of Lebanon

Hezbollah and the Future of Lebanon

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The 18-month political gridlock in Lebanon has come to a happy end with the Hezbollah-led opposition and the pro-Western governing coalition reaching an agreement in Doha, Qatar. Both camps stepped back from the brink of all-out civil war and agreed to elect General Michel Suleiman, the commander of Lebanese Armed Forces, as president of Lebanon, and form a cabinet in which Hezbollah will be able to exercise veto power over pivotal domestic and foreign policy decisions.

Last Sunday Lebanon’s parliament elected Suleiman as head of state, reviving paralyzed institutions and dreams of peace and prosperity. But the agreement reached in Qatar does not address the problems that ignited the crisis: the future of sectarian-based institutions in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s weapons stocks, a greater say for the dominant Shia community in the political process, Lebanon’s national identity, its relations with Syria and Iran, and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Doha deal represents a major victory for Hezbollah, or Party of God, and its regional patrons, Iran and Syrian, and a setback for supporters of the Lebanese government backed by the Western powers, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

In early May, Hezbollah did what many Lebanese had considered unthinkable: it turned its guns against internal opponents in Lebanon. By flexing its military muscle—and indeed swiftly routing opponents—the Shia group showed itself to be the most powerful institution in the country, even more powerful than the state itself.

By its actions, Hezbollah also showed that the wishful, naive thinking of the Bush administration and its Lebanese allies—in particular, that they could isolate and ignore the powerful Shia group by simply denouncing it as a “terrorist” organization—could not withstand the political and military reality in Lebanon. The pro-Western Beirut government monstrously miscalculated when they ignored calls to fully engage Hezbollah and give the opposition a major role in decision-making.

But although Hezbollah’s show of force and ability to cash in politically on its military success is impressive, its actions may well have been damaging to Hezbollah itself, as well as the hope for the kind of durable political settlement Lebanon so desperately needs.

Although few doubted Hezbollah¹s military capability, most Lebanese believed that it would only use its arsenal to defend the country against Israel. Since the end of Lebanon’s civil war in 1991, there has been an explicit understanding that Hezbollah would not target rival pro-Western forces at home. Hezbollah leaders stressed that they did not want to upset Lebanon’s fragile balance or establish an Islamic regime along the Iranian model.

Hezbollah’s storming of West Beirut has rendered its assurances hollow. Recently a Lebanese University journalism student, heretofore sympathetic to Hezbollah, wrote me: “I and other school friends are terribly disappointed by Hezbollah’s resort to force against its pro-government opponents.”

Some of Hezbollah’s staunchest supporters openly criticized its decision to employ force against the pro-American governing coalition. They noted that getting bogged down in Lebanon’s political quagmire discredits and delegitimizes the organization as one dedicated to “resistance.” As a result, Hezbollah supporters concede that it’s popular appeal in the Sunni-dominated Arab world, as well as within Lebanon, has diminished. “By turning its weapons against the people, Hezbollah shows its real face and aggressive intentions,” wrote an Egyptian commentator. “Hezbollah has lost the high moral ground and its myth is shattered.”

In an interview with Al Jazeera, the leader of Lebanon’s Islamic Group, the largest Sunni organization, whose close ties with Hezbollah date back to the 1980s, said that Hezbollah’s actions alienated Sunni opinion. Hezbollah was now viewed as a sectarian militia. “Hezbollah is at war with the rest of the Lebanon’s population, trying to impose its viewpoints by force,” added Feisal Mulawi, an old guard member in his seventies. “Sunni-Shia unity was dealt a lethal blow.”

Hezbollah’s takeover of predominantly Sunni West Beirut was tantamount to pouring gasoline on the sectarian fire raging across the Middle East. Although the Lebanon crisis is essentially a political power struggle, it has recently acquired sectarian connotations, threatening Shia-Sunni coexistence and social harmony and peace throughout tiny Lebanon.

Hezbollah leaders have labored hard to downplay the divisive nature of this crisis, but their actions were far more persuasive than their words for many Lebanese, who see Hezbollah as not only sectarian but a tool of Shia Iran. Their fears are shared in Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen, by leaders who criticized Hezbollah for serving Iranian imperial designs in the region.

This criticism represents a significant change of opinion. After Hezbollah withstood a 33-day war with Israel in July 2006, its popularity skyrocketed all over Muslim lands. Everywhere I traveled in the region, Nasrallah’s portrait and slogans were plastered on houses, public buildings, and cars. In opinion polls, Hezbollah chief Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah topped the list of most liked and admired Muslim leaders. During Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of fasting and spiritual reflection, merchants called their most prized and expensive dates “Nasrallah.”

Now the Arab public mood appears to have shifted against Hezbollah. More and more Sunnis view the Shia organization in sectarian terms. They see it as an arm of Iranian foreign policy. More than its enemies could have ever done, Hezbollah has unwittingly undermined its own claim to be a nationalist resistance movement.

Hezbollah might have won a tactical battle against its domestic opponents in Lebanon, but it has lost the struggle for Arab and Muslim hearts and minds. With its backing in Lebanon and the region now much diminished, Hezbollah will face greater difficulties taking on Israel.

Since the dust has not settled on the battlefield, it is too early to make definite conclusions. But Hezbollah’s leaders are worried. Hezbollah chiefs have stressed that their military operations were limited, merely a reaction to two government decisions targeting the party’s telecoms networks and chief of security at Beirut airport. Attempting to implicate the Bush administration, they have blamed U.S. officials for pushing the Lebanese cabinet to target Hezbollah¹s infrastructure, calling the targeting “a declaration of war.”

At the same time, Hezbollah has moved quickly to calm Sunni-Shia tensions. “We want a political settlement that will lead, in the end, to there being no victor and no vanquished,” declared Hezbollah’s deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Kassem. But Hezbollah knows perfectly well that as a result of its actions, its rivals feel humiliated and vanquished by their weakened bargaining position. The agreement reached in Doha reflects the new balance of power imposed by twisting the arms of the Lebanese government.

Although the agreement and the election of a new president are a step in the right direction, Hezbollah shoulders greater responsibilities in healing national wounds and strengthening state institutions. The future of any Lebanese government will now depend on whether Hezbollah is willing to make the transition from a paramilitary organization into a full-fledged political party and make the compromises that such a transition entails, which, above all, include representing the interests of disenfranchised Lebanese Shia, not outside powers.

Similarly, other confessional-based groups must recognize that the only way to bring about long-term stability in Lebanon is to give the Shia community—which represents more than 40 percent of the population, and which has the least say in politics—a greater role in governance.

What this means is that the very future of Lebanon as a nation-state will ultimately depend on whether the dominant Muslim and Christian communities will have the vision to transform sectarian-based institutions into a citizen-based democracy.

The jury is still out.

Fawaz A. Gerges holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Sarah Lawrence. He is the author of Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy and The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. Photo: A pro-Syrian demonstration in Beirut in 2006 (Bertil Videt / Creative Commons).