Elections Ahead: A Turning Point for Greece?
Elections Ahead: A Turning Point for Greece?
Kostis Karpozilos: A Turning Point for Greece?
Last Wednesday Prime Minister Lucas Papademos called for Greek parliamentary elections to be held on May 6, the same Sunday as the French presidential contest. This signified the end of a prolonged period of speculation over whether elections would be held, but does not guarantee an exodus from widespread social and political turbulence. It is the first time that Greeks will vote after experiencing the consequences of the euro crisis and austerity measures in their everyday lives. Interest in the outcome of the elections, therefore, is not confined to Greece. The pivotal role of the Greek crisis in Europe, and the parallels with Spain, Italy, and Portugal, have turned the elections of May 6 into a case study of how societies respond to the crisis, and how the crisis has changed existing political forces.
In November 2011 the crumbling political establishment sought refuge in an unprecedented maneuver: the formation of a coalition government of PASOK (the center-left party that governed Greece prior to the coalition), New Democracy (the traditional right-wing party), and LAOS (a far-right populist party). This ?national unity? government, under Papademos, implemented austerity measures while postponing elections in the name of ?imminent priorities??that is, the signing of a new agreement (the ?Second Memorandum?) with the IMF. What initially appeared as a temporary solution gradually developed into a permanent situation: for the last six months, Greece has had a non-elected government led by a former vice president of the European Central Bank. The situation echoed the establishment stance a few years ago toward the national referendums on euro-constitutions and treaties: they were repeated till the desirable outcome was reached. Under such conditions, the forthcoming parliamentary elections could have constitutional significance.
Over the last six months Greek society has been paralyzed by repeated postponement of the elections and the deepening of the depression, leading to a vicious cycle of apathy, anger, and despair, in which political platforms often seem to make no difference. In November hundreds of thousands protested, waiting for ?something to happen,? while this April the announcement of the elections was met with empty streets. On Wednesday, April 11 the main issue was not the elections but two other stories: Akis Tsochatzopoulos, a former minister of defense and a PASOK figurehead, was arrested in his townhouse and accused of operating several offshore companies that handled millions of euros from illegal activities connected with armament sales; and new official unemployment figures were released?21 percent, compared to 14 percent at the same time last year. The breach between the ?old? political personnel and the ?new? poor of Greece, illustrated in these contrasting stories and in any number of polls, is essential in understanding the rise of anti-political tendencies in Greece and the lack of enthusiastic support for any of the existing ruling parties.
In this context it is no surprise that PASOK (under the leadership of Vangelis Venizelos) and New Democracy (led by Antonis Samaras) appear extremely weak, with New Democracy polling at around 20 percent and PASOK at 15 percent. Their downfall destabilizes a mostly bipolar political system that traditionally produced strong parliamentary majorities, though there is no reason that this development must be permanent. The two parties are expected to recover somewhat in the weeks leading up to the elections; for most analysts the critical issue is whether they will reach 50 percent, allowing them to form a new coalition government. This has produced a paradoxical situation: both parties are competing for power but have no real differences in their agendas and know that their call for ?stability? will possibly force them into a repetition of the November 2011 experiment. Both claim to offer stability through austerity and remaining on the euro, as opposed to a future of chaos, foreclosure, and expulsion from the Eurozone.
The growth of various anti-memorandum parties that claim to offer an alternative to this dilemma, such as the right-wing Independent Greeks, reveals popular tendencies, but it is questionable whether they will survive in the long run. Nonetheless, the case of the Independent Greeks, led by former New Democracy MP Panos Kammenos, is indicative. In less than a month it has gained 7 to 10 percent of the popular vote in the polls, suggesting that the traditional dividing lines of left and right no longer hold. Its nationalistic, populist agenda, similar to that of the UK Independence Party, highlights how resentment of international financial institutions fuels ?national pride? and more importantly the appeal of a ?national solution? to the European problem. The same holds for the fascist Golden Dawn, an insignificant neo-Nazi group that has escaped marginality by promoting ?law and order? in the streets of Athens. Golden Dawn has reached 6 percent in the polls, and though its support will likely diminish toward election day, its success illustrates in striking fashion some of the sources of discontent with the political establishment, and the end of a time when the Nazi label brought permanent social marginalization.
These tendencies reveal deep transformations of Greek society, including the shift of the public agenda to the conservative Right. In contrast with what many believe, Greece is not facing the prospect of imminent social revolution from the left. To the contrary, we have seen a constant and often subtle shift toward conservative solutions. A few weeks ago the coalition government announced a plan for camps where thousands of undocumented immigrants would be confined; this measure appeared as the sole solution to a controversial social issue, and was met with widespread applause. The two ruling parties, PASOK and New Democracy, constantly target the social state, or what is left of it, and demonize central values of the post-junta democracy. They both attack the ?extreme? Left, calling it ?dangerous? and threatening to the stability of the state, in rhetoric that echoes a time when political activity was criminalized.
The recent strengthening of the fragmented Greek Left appears more fragile in this light. Even though it is anticipated that the various radical left parties will exceed 20 percent of the popular vote, their temporary success cannot disguise their inherent vulnerability: the lack of a persuasive alternative program. They have been unable to transform their anti-austerity slogans into a coherent plan for the ?day after.?
Two weeks ago a seventy-seven-year-old pensioner committed suicide in the middle of Parliament Square. It was a shocking public statement. Dimitris Christoulas was an ?ordinary fellow,? a pharmacist and a leftist. In his suicide note he condemned the austerity measures and called for an insurrection, giving voice to the despair that has penetrated Greek society. During the 2009 euro elections, former Prime Minister George Papandreou, quoting Rosa Luxemburg, told the Greek people that their choice was ?socialism or barbarism?; just three years later it is evident how far we have marched toward the latter.
