A Political Solution For Vietnam?

A Political Solution For Vietnam?

The poor prospects for peace in Vietnam arise directly from the military and political situation. Militarily, the war continues to be a stalemate, neither side being capable of winning, but both being able to deny victory to the opponent indefinitely. Politically, there is no stalemate; the NLF remains, as it has for more than ten years, the only national presence with the organization and capability to rule South Vietnam. The Saigon regime more or less controls a large army and somewhat manages a corrupt bureaucracy, but it has no base in Vietnamese society that would allow it to survive peace and withdrawal. Third-force leaders with any actual or potential political following in South Vietnam are treated as criminals by Saigon; they are mostly in jail or hiding in the countryside. These third-force groups seek a negotiated settlement of the war that would entail some degree of territorial and political sharing of power with the NLF (i.e., the presumed objective in Paris).

(i.e., the presumed objective in Paris). The Thieu-Ky government has no incentive for such an outcome of the war. As soon as the American forces leave, the political dominance of the NLF would assert itself throughout the countryside, the junior military leadership of ARVN would be likely to defect or at least to remain aloof, and some kind of takeover in Saigon would likely deprive the present rulers of their power, and possibly of their life. Everything about the behavior of the Thieu-Ky group...


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