The Case of Comrade Djilas

The Djilas case is obviously of the first importance, another sign of that molecular disintegration at work in eastern Europe and a further proof, if any be needed, that the hope for political stability on the continent is sheer chimera.

When news of the Djilas affair reached this country, the press played dreary variations on the theme, when thieves fall out, and The New York Times, conscious of more sophisticated responsibilities, pointed to “Western influences” behind Djilas’ dissent from Titoism, an observation which caution might have taught the Times to forgo. The Djilas case is obviously of the first importance, another sign of that molecular disintegration at work in eastern Europe and a further proof, if any be needed, that the hope for political stability on the continent is sheer chimera.

What is remarkable about Djilas is not that he deviated, but the extent to which he deviated, the public character which the Tito government allowed the incident to assume, and the fact that, thus far, he remains among the living. None of the major American publications had the perspicacity to translate from his numerous articles in Borba, the central Titoist paper, and hence we find ourselves indebted to Labor Action, a socialist weekly, for providing such translations.

From these translations of Djilas’ articles we learn that his public attack on the Titoist “Old Guard” was almost as thorough as that launched by Trotsky against the Bolshevik “Old Guard” in 1923. Facile comparisons are not intended: Djilas is no Trotsky, either as to character or mind, and the situation in Yugoslavia is not really akin to that of Russia in the post-revolution years. Yet some highly limited similarities enforce themselves. Djilas singles out the “Old Guard” of Partisans for his most pointed remarks, accusing them of having become a “caste of snobs”—and in the context he makes clear enough that he is speaking of social relations rather than table manners. Djilas’ greatest support seems to come from among the intellectuals and the youth, as well as certain national minorities within the multi-national Yugoslav state. And most striking of all: he seems clearly to be tempted by the idea of a multi-party system, yet for reasons both of caution and his upbringing in the Stalin-Tito tradition, he hesitates to speak for it bluntly. Tito’s charges against him, however, clearly indicate that in private conversation Djilas did declare for “another” party—and that a number of secondary leaders listened with some sympathy! That, more than anything else, must have alarmed the inner core of the regime.

Such a development was inevitable. Given the Titoist break from the Cominform; given the consequent need to develop some sort of “independent” ideology with which to oppose both East and West while simultaneously—and this is the heart of the Titoist dilemma—maintaining its dictatorial power; given the increasing if constantly skittish employment of “democratic” terminology—was it not to be expected that some eleme...