The Crisis in Greece
The Crisis in Greece
Kostis Karpozilos: The Crisis in Greece
This week the Greek parliament will debate and vote on yet more austerity measures, after the austerity-and-loan agreement reached in the spring of 2010 failed to shore up the country?s finances. The new proposals would impose higher taxes, even for those whose annual income is under ?8,000; initiate extensive privatization of state assets, and major reductions in public employment; and make more cuts to social services. You don?t have to be a radical to detect the character of these measures; according to the new Greek financial minister, Evangelos Venizelos, ?they are harsh and often socially unfair.?
Much of what has been written about the crisis focuses on the impressive facts and figures. Greek national debt has risen to over ?330 billion, or over 150 percent of GDP?higher than any other EU member state. Sixteen percent of the workforce is unemployed, and it?s worse for the young. Over 42 percent of workers under twenty-four are unemployed, and nearly 23 percent of workers between twenty-five and thirty-four. The average pay for a young person working full time is ?591 per month.
Numbers, though, cannot describe the depressive lack of hope that is the consequence of Greece?s financial dead end. Greek society faces another round of austerity policies that will not solve its economic problems, but which are justified as necessary to secure further loans from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Otherwise, the country would face bankruptcy, which, because of Greece?s membership in the Eurozone, would bring unforeseen consequences.
This is the dilemma repeated over and over: commit to austerity and foreign loans with little prospect for economic recovery, or default and set off unpredictable ripples in the global economic system. The structure of this dilemma reflects the main issue in the Greek crisis. The Greek parliament and international financial institutions impose austerity measures for fear of an unknown future, not to guarantee an exodus from the reality of an economic crisis that is generating new types of poverty in the streets of Athens. Irrelevant party quarrels and the recent governmental crisis did not lead to the adoption of new policies, but instead to the implementation of a new version of the abovementioned dilemma. Political discussion seems confined to facts and numbers, deficits and profits, with little actual debate on the questions of the validity of the euro, the position of Greece in the EU, or the European dimension of the crisis.
The inability of the (relatively strong) Greek Left to alter the conditions of this dilemma is probably the best indication of the prevailing attitude: we can describe what is happening, we can understand the causes, we experience the consequences?and yet we cannot propose a coherent, dynamic, and inspirational alternative program. The lack of hope intensifies the frustration that large segments of the population feel toward the government, the EU, and the IMF. Popular discontent is expressed in multiple ways. Polls reveal the deterioration of the ruling parties? appeal, deputies are abused when seen in public, and every day thousands of ordinary people, not just the usual suspects of Greek street activism, gather around parliament, chanting monotonously, ?Thieves, thieves.?
The recent demonstrations in front of the parliament in Syntagma Square, a distant echo of the Tahrir Square revolt, are mainly anti-party oriented, as those involved make no differentiation between the Left and the rest of the political spectrum. The demonstrators? rhetoric targets politicians as traitors and demonizes the austerity measures, but it seems that no particular demands unify this heterogeneous gathering beyond a common feeling of dissatisfaction. The evident political void gives space to nationalistic sentiments that are at the same time anti-state, anti-labor, and anti-immigrant, creating favorable conditions for the appearance of a capable demagogic force that advocates a policy of national independence and pride.
The announced forty-eight-hour general strike, scheduled to begin tomorrow, will be complemented by efforts to encircle the parliament as it debates austerity measures for 2012 through 2015. This is not the first general strike since the financial crisis began; over the last few months the streets of Athens have seen hundreds of thousands (in a country of 11 million) protesting and demanding the withdrawal of the IMF policies. The strikes reflect the changes in the workforce and the end of an era of traditional, state-dependent labor unions, which were for years associated with the ruling party, PASOK. The majority of protestors have no particular association with labor unions, are often young, and are critical of and hostile to a labor aristocracy that for years excluded temporary workers from unions. Organized marchers constitute a minority of the crowd. The only exception to this is the ranks of the red unions under the auspices of the ?All Workers Militant Front,? which is associated with the Communist Party. The fragmentation of these demonstrations is an indication of new types of radicalization and politicization that have not yet found common spaces of expression. As a result, massive participation in general strikes does not transfer to militancy in sectors of the economy (banks, communications, and so on) where company unions, harsh conditions, and fear predominate.
The anticipated strike might seem like a new episode of tension and upheaval, but it is quite possible that it will more resemble a rerun. Marchers will gather in big numbers, police forces will menace and provoke, and violent clashes around the parliament will escalate in massive attacks against protestors. In these confrontations there are few rules, a reflection of chaotic social conditions. Middle-aged protestors will suffer police brutality, hundreds will be rushed to hospitals due to suffocating tear gas, and at the end of the day a majority of the parliament will vote in favor of austerity measures, while asking?once again?for ?patience? and ?consensus.? The current feeling of hopelessness is once again extended indefinitely into the future.
But it is also possible that the unrest could lead to repressive measures in the name of democratic stability, or to a ?national unity? government that will try to marginalize any opposition in the name of ?national good.? Two weeks ago, in the aftermath of the last general strike, scenarios of compromise between the ruling party and the right-wing opposition were circulated for hours. Just yesterday government vice-president Theodoros Pangalos suggested that withdrawal from the euro would result in a chaotic bank run, forcing army tanks to intervene on the streets. In a society with recent memories of repression?a military junta ruled from 1967 to 1974?such references create widespread anxiety and aim to undermine any opposition to the austerity measures. Pangalos is right about one thing, though. In times of crisis, we often don?t dare to imagine the worst possible outcomes, even though we understand that the certainties of the past no longer hold.
Image: Protesters in Syntagma Square (May 25, 2011, Wiki. Com.)
