“Bad Vibes”: On Populism and Crisis Denial in Argentina
“Bad Vibes”: On Populism and Crisis Denial in Argentina
Argentina is facing an impending crisis with significant global implications. In recent months Argentines have experienced rapidly rising inflation, while international creditors are expressing doubts about the country’s ability to make debt repayments. The Argentine administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has partly addressed some of these issues, with a significant currency devaluation and a few austerity measures as well as renewed negotiations with international debtors. But its government prefers not to talk about the crisis or even to recognize the situation as such. Why is this the case?
The answer to this pressing question is rooted in the history of populism in Latin America, and has less to do with economics than with the ideology behind the Argentine president’s narrative about the past, the present, and the future. The current situation in Argentina also illuminates similar public attitudes in other countries where the political theology of populism is at work, especially Venezuela. In both countries, there is a tendency to equate the national administration with the country as a whole; criticism of the former raises doubts among followers about the survival of the latter.
There is little new about Argentina being in crisis. From the 1930s onward, the country has had many financial crises associated, like the current one, with inflation and capital outflows. This period of volatility differs from past ones in that it comes on the heels of many years of high commodity prices, which have led to an expansion of Argentinian exports. The present crisis is part of a long tradition of economic mismanagement, but in a novel context of trade surpluses and economic growth.
Open Letter, a group of Argentine pro-government intellectuals, announced this month that the “fatherland is in danger.” Yet these populist intellectuals were not making reference to the crisis but rather criticizing those that talk about it. Indeed, any reference to this situation is presented as an “anti-patriotic act.” This past week President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner denounced “a chain of bad vibes” regarding her handling of the economy—criticisms that she implies are a move against democratic rule.
This comes shortly after Kirchner’s month-long absence from public life this winter, for a retreat in Patagonia. Many citizens believed that she wasn’t working during this time, although administration officials have denied this was the case. When she finally broke her silence in a jovial speech in late January, she did not address the reasons behind her long and unusual absence from public life and her job, nor did she address the urgent economic situation or recent currency devaluations. Instead, she spoke to her supporters—who have a tendency to believe that she is always right and, more importantly, that she has no need to explain herself. Her charismatic leadership style can only be accepted on faith.
Like General Juan Perón and subsequent Peronist presidents, such as Carlos Menem, Kirchner’s governing style is rooted in an authoritarian form of democracy that disdains checks and balances. She has demonstrated a tendency to equate the questioning of elected authorities with dictatorial impulses; the opposition, and political minorities, are delegitimized, while deliberation and consultation are portrayed as leading to instability and authoritarianism. An apocalyptic fight between the nation and its enemies is an essential dimension of this hierarchical populist leadership style. Kirchner believes that as an elected leader she must think, and act, for the majority of citizens who voted for her, while disregarding the interests of minority groups. Those voters are expected to abide by the administration’s decision-making without any meaningful participation or detailed explanation from their leader.
Kirchner’s administration has manipulated economic indexes and social statistics while unsuccessfully attempting, for many years now, to control consumer goods prices and currency exchange. These measures have been part of a dramatic attempt to make reality conform to the president’s narrative, but they are not the only examples of political camouflage at work. The president simply ignores her critics, suggesting that they do not even have the legitimacy to question her. But if, following the narrative of the Argentine administration, the country is doing fine, why does Kirchner refuse to address the many Argentines who believe they face an economic crisis?
Federico Finchelstein is an Argentine historian and associate professor of history at the New School in New York City. He is the author of the forthcoming book, The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War. Diego Finchelstein is a political scientist and economist residing in Argentina. He teaches at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and is Guest Professor at Universidad de San Andres and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
