

beyond the welfare state, and there were such during the seventies, did not win a convincing majority. Therefore, quite properly, the Meidner plan (which would effectively have abolished capitalism through wage-earner funds) is on a back burner for the time being. I think it will be revived.

The real question is: what would one need to see Sweden or any other country as moving toward socialism? My somewhat simplified answer is that Sweden would have to move in two major directions. The first is to effectively expand control over the workplace through councils that involve the vast majority of workers in making day-to-day decisions about their work life, personnel decisions, and the overall direction their enterprises should take. Such bodies should control management and be regarded as the economic counterpart to local self-government. The second is to abolish the present concentrations of private ownership. Mixed forms of property ownership—private, public, and cooperative—along the lines de-

scribed by Alec Nove make good sense. Clearly great concentrations of private wealth are incompatible with socialism or, for that matter, democracy. While very steep progressive taxation combined with an almost confiscatory inheritance tax could alleviate this problem, in the more advanced welfare states we still have the question of the social and political effects of great concentrations of wealth.

Gross differences in wealth and income are unacceptable from the point of view of either equity or democratic theory. Wealth tends to translate into political and social power. Democracy cannot exist in any meaningful sense when there are gross disparities in political power. That argument is so obvious and well established that it provides today the most effective language with which to express the socialist argument—the language of democracy. Thus my ultimate argument is that the welfare state should move in a socialist direction so as to complete the democratic transformation of society.

Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller

The demise of communism after the revolutions of 1989 has been, understandably, hailed by the right as the ultimate “proof” of the fiasco of the socialist idea as a whole. More surprising than the rightist glee is the self-querying mood of many noncommunist socialists who, precisely now, want to find metaphysical or sociological “proofs” and “guarantees” of the survival and longevity of their movement. But there are no such guarantees. Every culture prior to ours harbored influential trends that at some point lost their vitality and vanished, for various reasons. Our culture is no exception. It is entirely in the hands of socialists here and now whether their great movement, which has molded modernity for two centuries, is doomed to extinction or whether socialism will find the inner energy for rejuvenation.

Viewed in perspective, social democrats and libertarian socialists of all hues should now

have ample reason for joy. The scarecrow, whose presence has always triggered the accusation of conspiring to introduce a government of terror, leveled against them whenever they proposed social change, is now gone. Yet it seems as though old-time democratic socialists, enemies of communism for reasons of principle, are anxious rather than relieved. This perplexity of (noncommunist) socialism is a highly revealing feeling, conveying the message that noncommunist socialism has not faced seriously the complex issue of the historic achievements and internal limitations of its own theory and politics. The critique of communism seemed to have spared socialism this unpleasant task, which can no longer be postponed.

Above all, socialism does not seem to have made an honest inventory of its contribution to the “normal” development of modernity. Even if socialists completely disinherit communism

as an intruder into their family, even if, as a result, they accept no responsibility for communism's crimes, the fact still remains that the socialist contribution to normally developed modernity has been dangerously curtailed so far in several areas.

Their major claim to recognition—one without which the “Roman degeneration” of modernity into Caesarism on the one hand and the permanent indigence of the industrial proletariat on the other would have been inescapable—is the legitimization of “the social question.” The neglected needs of the working classes, as well as of those who have been forced to idleness, enjoys, for the first time in recorded history, a pride of place on the political agenda only as a result of the socialists' stubborn campaigning. This achievement is their glory.

The socialists provided the idea of relative equality and that of social justice with a balanced meaning beyond extremist excesses. They have, furthermore, contributed to the development of parliamentary democracy in the nineteenth, and in Spain and Portugal even in the twentieth, century by mobilizing the proletariat, initially an outcast of civil society and almost completely uninterested in politics, to transform itself into an electoral constituency and boost its social and economic power. However, socialism accepted ready-made the idea and the *modus operandi* of democracy, and it has added virtually nothing to democratic theory and practice. The indifference to and often contempt for liberalism felt by many socialists blinded them to the moblike features and the totalitarian potentials of democracy. Perception of the latter has been traditionally regarded as “aristocratism” among socialists who were committed democrats.

For the most part, the economic system of modernity developed without their participation other than as critics, which was, admittedly, a crucial function. Even when the socialists did not harbor ideas of radical utopias of a marketless society, they have, for good reasons, always considered the market a necessary evil and, rightly, market logic the principle of a continually reproduced inequality. The only economic strategy they felt affinity with, and whose agents proper they were when in

government, was the Keynesian. Their traditional, and perfectly legitimate, relationship to the market has been in the last half century cohabitation and a policy of proposing restrictions with a view to social justice (which, in combination, is what “market socialism” is all about). So far, with the exception of Willy Brandt's vague theses on the North-South relationship, socialists have not been particularly receptive to the problems arising out of the disproportions of global economy—although world economy is now the adequate framework, as was the nation state in Keynes's time, in which recommendations for social justice and (nonmarket) rationality can be raised and implemented.

Their overwhelmingly urban origins and culture prevented the socialists from adding an iota to the agrarian question. The only redeeming feature in this regard was their zeal in implementing a program of land partitioning during certain agrarian revolutions, and this was not their own proposal. Perhaps for that reason they also overslept the emergence of the environmentalist issue, which has been advocated by nonsocialist actors.

As for nationhood and nationalism, democratic socialists or social democrats have an almost entirely unblemished record of being enemies of national, ethnic, or race bias of all kinds. (The shameful episode of the “White Australia Policy” of Australian Labour remained an incident without further consequences in the annals of socialism.) At the same time, albeit loyal citizens, socialists always felt ill at ease about national identification. They were not internationalists in the communist sense of building a Universal Church of the Grand Inquisitor, but they were certainly cosmopolitan in an age of nationalism. Only one socialist contingent, the Zionist Labor, became a nation-builder, and another, French socialism from Jaurès to Mitterrand, has contributed to the greatness of *la nation*, with only a single relapse into chauvinism (under Guy Mollet during the Algerian war). The rest of them stood awkwardly on the sideline whenever the nation and its affairs were on the agenda.

Finally, they have an ambiguous cultural record. For them, communism was tantamount either to state censorship or to intellectual elitism. By contrast, social democrats were betting on a genuine proletarian culture in an age when class culture was already disintegrating. The government of democratic socialists in the welfare state was a benevolent patron of the arts; and the socialist movement spread literacy and the light of knowledge where the darkness of ignorance had reigned supreme. We owe the discovery of, and the support for, the best products of working-class culture (in Great Britain), as well as some of the best novels (in Scandinavia and postwar Germany), to this welfarist patronage and social democratic spirit. But social democracy, in its aversion to intellectual elitism, has constantly lacked the great vision necessary for the flourishing of culture.

The vacuum created by the demise of communism is beneficial for socialists only if they are capable of making an inventory of their peak performances and serious limitations. For, let us be honest, the existence of communism was not merely an obstacle for democratic socialists. In strange ways, it was also a blessing in disguise. As long as communist governments of terror or repression existed, it sufficed for democratic socialists or social democrats to pinpoint the communist practices with the remark: we shall do it in a different way. This gesture alone guaranteed votes. But now, with the scarecrow gone, they are left alone on the left, and they have to do the work in a different way or perish. To be capable of performing the new task, it is mandatory that they address their own past record.

Branko Horvat

In order to find out how much a country is socialist, it is necessary first to define socialism. Characteristically, no clear, precise, and commonly accepted definition exists. My own definition is extensively discussed elsewhere (*The Political Economy of Socialism*, Sharpe, 1982) and can be only briefly summarized here.

1. *Socialism is a phase in the process of the individuation of men and women, of their emancipation from various collectivities (tribe, estate, class, nation), of their progress in the direction of individual self-determination.* (Note that individuation has nothing to do with possessive egoism and implies, rather than excludes, genuine social consciousness.) In this sense, socialism contributes to the fulfillment of the three proclaimed goals of the bourgeois revolutions: liberty, equality, and solidarity. The three ideals cannot be separated and imply each other: unequal liberty destroys equality, lack of equality makes the freedoms of some individuals deficient, and solidarity is the behavioral precondition for the achievement of liberty and equality. Against this standard, it is not particularly difficult to measure the performance of Sweden or any other country.

2. *If the full personal development of individual men and women is the supreme goal, social equity is the basis of the system called socialism.* That implies the elimination of any concentration of political and economic power. In this sense the three goals may be approximated through political and economic democracy and government-sponsored solidarity.

3. *Socialist political democracy includes all classical rights and freedoms of citizens and also replaces party politics (parties are concentrations of power) by citizens' politics.* In other words, elections do not depend on party finances and party bosses, and the relation between electors and their representatives in the parliament is personalized. The representative is primarily responsible to electors, not to a party, and the party whip is absent. The issues are decided on their merits, not in the interest of party oligarchies. Substantial, as contrasted to purely formal criteria are generally applicable: similarly, as a formal democratic procedure is not sufficient in socialist politics, neither is formal equality before law. A corporation or a state agency, with vast means at its disposal, and an individual citizen cannot be equal parties in the