For our war, for our purposes, to save American lives, we have reached the point where we say that anything goes. That is what the Germans said at the beginning of the war. Once we have won our war, we say that there must be international law. Undoubtedly. When it is created, Germans, Japanese, and Americans will remember with horror the days of their shame.

Well, we do not look back in horror, not as we should. We are not the Germans and not the Japanese, and we have less to answer for. But answer we should and must. The minority favoring ethical restraint was not the dominant voice, but it was an important voice and it should not be forgotten. Now that an era has ended—now that we have entered the long tunnel at the end of the light, as Václav Havel puts it—my hunch is that how we remember and what we remember of events in mid-century is bound to be altered. The civic energy that sustained our dominant "reading" of events is depleted.

Hiroshima seems long ago and far away. As the World War II generation dies—that generation of Americans that served so well and gave so much—the passion will perhaps go out of this and other issues, like air escaping a punctured tire. The debates will become more abstract, more depersonalized, less interesting. Because Hiroshima, however hideous and—in my view—unjustified, can still be seen as an act of war, whereas the Nazi machinery of mechanized death seems something else altogether, my own sense is that interest in the bombings will wane over the next quarter-century. There will be good and bad reasons for that. The bad reason is the deepening of the view that what is done in the heat and fog of a terrible war cannot and should not be revisited critically and ethically (by contrast to tendentiously and with an eye to setting up new demons and angels—as in the Smithsonian fracas, which has only reinforced militant self-exculpation by those angered at the arch-revisionists). The good reason is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki must inevitably become reinserted in the warp and woof of history, not viewed as symbols hovering above the bloody ground that was World War II but as particularly powerful and tormenting events on that very ground.

John Rawls

The fiftieth year since the bombing of Hiroshima is a time to reflect about what one should think of it. Is it really a great wrong, as many now think, and many also thought then, or is it perhaps justified after all? I believe that both the fire-bombing of Japanese cities beginning in the spring of 1945 and the later atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6 were very great wrongs, and rightly seen as such. In order to support this opinion, I set out what I think to be the principles governing the conduct of war—jus in bello—of democratic peoples. These peoples have different ends of war than nondemocratic, especially totalitarian, states, such as Germany and Japan, which sought the domination and exploitation of subjected peoples, and in Germany’s case, their enslavement if not extermination.

Although I cannot properly justify them here, I begin by setting out six principles and assumptions in support of these judgments. I hope they seem not unreasonable; and certainly they are familiar, as they are closely related to much traditional thought on this subject.

1. The aim of a just war waged by a decent democratic society is a just and lasting peace between peoples, especially with its present enemy.

2. A decent democratic society is fighting against a state that is not democratic. This follows from the fact that democratic peoples do not wage war against each other; and since we are con-

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Thomas Nagel, and T. M. Scanlon for discussing this essay with me. Responsibility for the opinions expressed is, of course, my own.
cerned with the rules of war as they apply to such peoples, we assume the society fought against is nondemocratic and that its expansionist aims threatened the security and free institutions of democratic regimes and caused the war.

3. In the conduct of war, a democratic society must carefully distinguish three groups: the state's leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population. The reason for these distinctions rests on the principle of responsibility: since the state fought against is not democratic, the civilian members of the society cannot be those who organized and brought on the war. This was done by its leaders and officials assisted by other elites who control and staff the state apparatus. They are responsible, they willed the war, and for doing that, they are criminals. But civilians, often kept in ignorance and swayed by state propaganda, are not. And this is so even if some civilians knew better and were enthusiastic for the war. In a nation's conduct of war many such marginal cases may exist, but they are irrelevant. As for soldiers, they, just as civilians, and leaving aside the upper ranks of an officer class, are not responsible for the war, but are conscripted or in other ways forced into it, their patriotism often cruelly and cynically exploited. The grounds on which they may be attacked directly are not that they are responsible for the war but that a democratic people cannot defend itself in any other way, and defend itself it must do. About this there is no choice.

4. A decent democratic society must respect the human rights of the members of the other side, both civilians and soldiers, for two reasons. One is because they simply have these rights by the law of peoples. The other reason is to teach enemy soldiers and civilians the content of those rights by the example of how they hold in their own case. The grounds on which they may be attacked directly are not that they are responsible for the war but that a democratic people cannot defend itself in any other way, and defend itself it must do. About this there is no choice.

6. Finally, we note the place of practical means-end reasoning in judging the appropriateness of an action or policy for achieving the aim of war or for not causing more harm than good. This mode of thought—whether carried on by (classical) utilitarian reasoning, or by cost-benefit analysis, or by weighing national interests, or in other ways—must always be framed within and strictly limited by the preceding principles. The norms of the conduct of war set up certain lines that bound just action. War plans and strategies, and the conduct of battles, must lie within their limits. (The only exception, I repeat, is in times of extreme crisis.)

In connection with the fourth and fifth principles of the conduct of war, I have said that they are binding especially on the leaders of nations. They are in the most effective position to represent their people's aims and obligations, and sometimes they become statesmen. But who is a statesman? There is no office of statesman, as there is of president, or chancellor, or prime minister. The statesman is an ideal, like the ideal of the truthful or virtuous individual. Statesmen are presidents or prime ministers who become statesmen through their exemplary performance and leadership in their office in difficult and trying times and manifest strength, wisdom, and courage. They guide their people through turbulent and dangerous periods for which they are esteemed always, as one of their great statesmen.

The ideal of the statesman is suggested by the saying: the politician looks to the next election,
the statesman to the next generation. It is the task of
the student of philosophy to look to the perma-
nent conditions and the real interests of a just and
good democratic society. It is the task of the states-
man, however, to discern these conditions and in-
terests in practice; the statesman sees deeper and
further than most others and grasps what needs to
be done. The statesman must get it right, or nearly
so, and hold fast to it. Washington and Lincoln
were statesmen. Bismarck was not. He did not see
Germany's real interests far enough into the fu-
ture and his judgment and motives were often dis-
torted by his class interests and his wanting him-
self alone to be chancellor of Germany. Statesmen
need not be selfless and may have their own inter-
ests when they hold office, yet they must be self-
less in their judgments and assessments of society's
interests and not be swayed, especially in war and
crisis, by passions of revenge and retaliation
against the enemy.

Above all, they are to hold fast to the aim of
gaining a just peace, and avoid the things that make
achieving such a peace more difficult. Here the
proclamations of a nation should make clear (the
statesman must see to this) that the enemy people
are to be granted an autonomous regime of their
own and a decent and full life once peace is se-
curely reestablished. Whatever they may be told
by their leaders, whatever reprisals they may rea-
sonably fear, they are not to be held as slaves or
serfs after surrender, or denied in due course their
full liberties; and they may well achieve freedoms
they did not enjoy before, as the Germans and the
Japanese eventually did. The statesman knows, if
others do not, that all descriptions of the enemy
people (not their rulers) inconsistent with this are
impulsive and false.

Turning now to Hiroshima and the fire-bomb-
ing of Tokyo, we find that neither falls under the
exemption of extreme crisis. One aspect of this is
that since (let's suppose) there are no absolute
rights—rights that must be respected in all circum-
stances—there are occasions when civilians can
be attacked directly by aerial bombing. Were there
times during the war when Britain could properly
have bombed Hamburg and Berlin? Yes, when
Britain was alone and desperately facing
Germany's superior might; moreover, this period
would extend until Russia had clearly beat off the
first German assault in the summer and fall of
1941, and would be able to fight Germany until
the end. Here the cutoff point might be placed dif-
cerently, say the summer of 1942, and certainly
by Stalingrad. I shan't dwell on this, as the cru-
cial matter is that under no conditions could Ger-
many be allowed to win the war, and this for two
basic reasons: first, the nature and history of con-
titutional democracy and its place in European
culture; and second, the peculiar evil of Nazism
and the enormous and uncalculable moral and po-
litical evil it represented for civilized society.

The peculiar evil of Nazism needs to be un-
derstood, since in some circumstances a demo-
ocratic people might better accept defeat if the terms
of peace offered by the adversary were reason-
able and moderate, did not subject them to hu-
miliation and looked forward to a workable and
decent political relationship. Yet characteristic of
Hitler was that he accepted no possibility at all of
a political relationship with his enemies. They were
always to be cowed by terror and brutality, and
ruled by force. From the beginning the campaign
against Russia, for example, was a war of destruc-
tion against Slavic peoples, with the original in-
habitants remaining, if at all, only as serfs. When
Goebbels and others protested that the war could
not be won that way, Hitler refused to listen.

Yet it is clear that while the extreme crisis ex-
emption held for Britain in the early stages of the
war, it never held at any time for the United States
in its war with Japan. The principles of the con-
duct of war were always applicable to it. Indeed,
in the case of Hiroshima many involved in higher
reaches of the government recognized the ques-
tionable character of the bombing and that limits
were being crossed. Yet during the discussions
among allied leaders in June and July 1945, the
weight of the practical means-end reasoning car-
rried the day. Under the continuing pressure of war,
such moral doubts as there were failed to gain an
express and articulated view. As the war pro-
gressed, the heavy fire-bombing of civilians in the
capitals of Berlin and Tokyo and elsewhere was
increasingly accepted on the allied side. Although
after the outbreak of war Roosevelt had urged both
sides not to commit the inhuman barbarism of
bombing civilians, by 1945 allied leaders came to
assume that Roosevelt would have used the bomb

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on Hiroshima. The bombing grew out of what had happened before.

The practical means-end reasons to justify using the atomic bomb on Hiroshima were the following:

The bomb was dropped to hasten the end of the war. It is clear that Truman and most other allied leaders thought it would do that. Another reason was that it would save lives where the lives counted are the lives of American soldiers. The lives of Japanese, military or civilian, presumably counted for less. Here the calculations of least time and most lives saved were mutually supporting. Moreover, dropping the bomb would give the Emperor and the Japanese leaders a way to save face, an important matter given Japanese samurai culture. Indeed, at the end a few top Japanese leaders wanted to make a last sacrificial stand but were overruled by others supported by the Emperor, who ordered surrender on August 12, having received word from Washington that the Emperor could stay provided it was understood that he had to comply with the orders of the American military commander. The last reason I mention is that the bomb was dropped to impress the Russians with American power and make them more agreeable with our demands. This reason is highly disputed but urged by some critics and scholars as important.

The failure of these reasons to reflect the limits on the conduct of war is evident, so I focus on a different matter: the failure of statesmanship on the part of allied leaders and why it might have occurred. Truman once described the Japanese as beasts and to be treated as such; yet how foolish it sounds now to call the Germans or the Japanese barbarians and beasts! Of the Nazis and Tojo militarists, yes, but they are not the German and the Japanese people. Churchill later granted that he carried the bombing too far, led by passion and the intensity of the conflict. A duty of statesmanship is not to allow such feelings, natural and inevitable as they may be, to alter the course a democratic people should best follow in striving for peace. The statesman understands that relations with the present enemy have special importance: for as I have said, war must be openly and publicly conducted in ways that make a lasting and amicable peace possible with a defeated enemy, and prepares its people for how they may be expected to be treated. Their present fears of being subjected to acts of revenge and retaliation must be put to rest; present enemies must be seen as associates in a shared and just future peace.

These remarks make it clear that, in my judgment, both Hiroshima and the fire-bombing of Japanese cities were great evils that the duties of statesmanship require political leaders to avoid in the absence of the crisis exemption. I also believe this could have been done at little cost in further casualties. An invasion was unnecessary at that date, as the war was effectively over. However, whether that is true or not makes no difference. Without the crisis exemption, those bombings are great evils. Yet it is clear that an articulate expression of the principles of just war introduced at that time would not have altered the outcome. It was simply too late. A president or prime minister must have carefully considered these questions, preferably long before, or at least when they had the time and leisure to think things out. Reflections on just war cannot be heard in the daily round of the pressure of events near the end of the hostilities; too many are anxious and impatient, and simply worn out.

Similarly, the justification of constitutional democracy and the basis of the rights and duties it must respect should be part of the public political culture and discussed in the many associations of civic society as part of one’s education. It is not clearly heard in day-to-day ordinary politics, but must be presupposed as the background, not the daily subject of politics, except in special circumstances. In the same way, there was not sufficient prior grasp of the fundamental importance of the principles of just war for the expression of them to have blocked the appeal of practical means-end reasoning in terms of a calculus of lives, or of the least time to end the war, or of some other balancing of costs and benefits. This practical reasoning justifies too much, too easily, and provides a way for a dominant power to quiet any moral worries that may arise. If the principles of war are put forward at that time, they easily become so many more considerations to be balanced in the scales.

Another failure of statesmanship was not to try to enter negotiations with the Japanese before
any drastic steps such as the fire-bombing of cities or the bombing of Hiroshima were taken. A conscientious attempt to do so was morally necessary. As a democratic people, we owed that to the Japanese people—whether to their government is another matter. There had been discussions in Japan for some time about finding a way to end the war, and on June 26 the government had been instructed by the Emperor to do so. It must surely have realized that with the navy destroyed and the outer islands taken, the war was lost. True, the Japanese were deluded by the hope that the Russians might prove to be their allies, but negotiations are precisely to disabuse the other side of delusions of that kind. A statesman is not free to consider that such negotiations may lessen the desired shock value of subsequent attacks.

Truman was in many ways a good, at times a very good president. But the way he ended the war showed he failed as a statesman. For him it was an opportunity missed, and a loss to the country and its armed forces as well. It is sometimes said that questioning the bombing of Hiroshima is an insult to the American troops who fought the war. This is hard to understand. We should be able to look back and consider our faults after fifty years. We expect the Germans and the Japanese to do that—"Vergangenheitsverarbeitung"—as the Germans say. Why shouldn’t we? It can’t be that we think we waged the war without moral error!

None of this alters Germany’s and Japan’s responsibility for the war nor their behavior in conducting it. Emphatically to be repudiated are two nihilist doctrines. One is expressed by Sherman’s remark, “War is hell,” so anything goes to get it over with as soon as one can. The other says that we are all guilty so we stand on a level and no one can blame anyone else. These are both superficial and deny all reasonable distinctions; they are invoked falsely to try to excuse our misconduct or to plead that we cannot be condemned.

The moral emptiness of these nihilisms is manifest in the fact that just and decent civilized societies—their institutions and laws, their civil life and background culture and mores—all depend absolutely on making significant moral and political distinctions in all situations. Certainly war is a kind of hell, but why should that mean that all moral distinctions cease to hold? And granted also that sometimes all or nearly all may be to some degree guilty, that does not mean that all are equally so. There is never a time when we are free from all moral and political principles and restraints. These nihilisms are pretenses to be free of those principles and restraints that always apply to us fully.

Notes

1 I sometimes use the term “peoples” to mean much the same as nations, especially when I want to contrast peoples with states and a state’s apparatus.

2 I assume that democratic peoples do not go to war against each other. There is considerable evidence of this important idea. See Michael Doyle’s two part article, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, Summer and Fall 1983. See his summary of the evidence in the first part, pp. 206-232.

3 Responsibility for war rarely falls on only one side and this must be granted. Yet some dirty hands are dirtier than others, and sometimes even with dirty hands a democratic people would still have the right and even the duty to defend itself from the other side. This is clear in World War II.


5 For the idea of status, I am indebted to discussions of Frances Kamm and Thomas Nagel.


7 I might add here that a balancing of interests is not involved. Rather, we have a matter of judgment as to whether certain objective circumstances are present which constitute the extreme crisis exemption. As with any other complex concept, that of such an exemption is to some degree vague. Whether or not the concept applies rests on judgment.


10 See McCullough’s *Truman*, p. 458, the exchange between Truman and Senator Russell of Georgia in August 1945.


13 See Weinberg, ibid., p. 886.