The One-State Solution:  
A breakthrough plan for peace in the 
Israeli-Palestinian deadlock

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The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is an existential one in which the real issue has been the mutual denial of the other’s right to exist. [1] From the late nineteenth century Jews and Palestinians have battled over each other’s legitimacy more than anything else. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 and – legally more significant – the League of Nations Mandate (approved in 1922, ratified in 1923) gave the Jews an important advantage in that the Palestinians were marginalised as ‘the existing non-Jewish communities,’ questioning their status as a nation or a people. However, within Palestinian narratives the Jews were constructed as outsiders with no national characteristics or legal rights. After the creation of the State of Israel, many Jews could hardly bring themselves to utter the words ‘Palestine’ or ‘Palestinians’ for fear that Israel’s legitimacy might be diminished. Palestinians, as with much of the Arab world, returned the compliment, referring to Israel only as the ‘Zionist entity.’ Only with the exchange of letters between the PLO and Israel attached to the 1993 Oslo Agreements did this situation begin to change. However, those agreements are now in tatters and the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian National Authority elections has brought to office a movement that does not recognise Israel’s right to exist. A new cycle of mutual de-legitimisation threatens to light a fire under the peace process.

Virginia Tilley’s The One-State Solution – which argues that Zionism, and therefore Israel, is illegitimate – risks pouring oil on these gathering flames. In Tilley’s view the creation of a single secular state for Israelis and Palestinians ‘would resolve the entire conflict in one magisterial gesture and is already an impending reality’ (p. 9). Israeli settlement activity, she argues, makes a two-state solution impractical but, more fundamentally, Israel – as a Jewish state – is immoral and should no more exist than apartheid South Africa. While most of her fire is aimed at Zionism, Palestinian nationalism is also dismissed as another form of backward ethnic nationalism. Palestinian nationalists are variously regarded as ‘lumpen,’ clinging to ‘fat sinecures’ or overly concerned with ‘the symbolic lexicon of Palestinian national
Zionism is dismissed as ‘Jewish ethnonationalist domination’ (p. 148) and Israel is defined as a state ‘grotesquely at odds with Western liberal democratic norms’ (p. 148).

‘Ethnonationalism’: Essentialising Zionism

The heart of Tilley’s book is a polemic about Zionism and what she calls ‘ethnonationalism.’ She argues that states based on ethnic identities are things of the past, observing that international society – and not just the Western democracies – rejects ‘ethnic domination over a state’ (p. 180). She seems to think that this warrants opposition to the existence of any state that is mainly based on an ethnic group. However, NATO’s 1999 war against Milosevic’s Serbia is producing just such an ethnically based state, Kosovo. The break up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia produced many more such states, and they have been recognised and integrated into the international community without comment. Advocates of Kurdish, Tibetan or Kashmiri self-determination are not assailed as supporting ‘ethnic domination’ – but Tilley repeatedly uses this phrase about Jewish nationalism.

Zionism, argues Tilley, advocates ‘ethnic statehood’ and so can only produce ethnic domination, exclusivity and dispossession. Zionism is a movement created not only as a reaction to anti-Semitism ‘but also by the rampant ethnonationalist ideologies’ (p. 181) resulting in:

a Jewish-national state in a territory that, unluckily, already held an ancient and politicised indigenous Arab society. The formula was always unworkable, as Zionism’s earliest architects recognised. Zionism’s success was always understood as to require the Arab’s mass transfer or exit – a goal twice sought by force (in 1948 and 1967) but not achieved (pp. 180-81).

Tilley constructs Zionism as an aggressive movement with the intention of expelling the Arab Palestinian population – twice trying and failing. However, if aggressive intent to expel was really the heart of Zionism, the failure to expel the Palestinians of the West Bank in the wake of the stunning military success of the 1967 war seems curious, to say the least. Moreover, the key resolutions adopted by Zionist Congresses do not support Tilley’s contention. The 1921 Carsbad congress declared:
The determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect and together with them make a common home into a flourishing community, the up-building of which assure each people of an undisturbed national development. [2]

Tilley does not seem to have engaged in a systematic study of Zionism and her account tends toward the superficial and rhetorical. In fact, Zionism – like any movement that has developed over more than a century – contains many strands and overlaps with many other ideologies. Tilley’s reductive view of Zionism as pure ethnic nationalism misses, to mention only this, the massive influence of socialist and communist ideas which certainly did not end with the creation of the state in 1948. Her use of selective quotations from right wing Zionists is not balanced by quotations from left-wing Zionists. Israelis who supported the Geneva initiative are ‘maverick’ but Rev Kook (p. 56) and Jabotinsky (pp. 110, 146, 158, 175) are treated as mainstream. Indeed, reading the book, I was reminded of the methods of the Orientalists in dealing with Islam. First, you essentialise the category you are dealing with into a homogeneous form and then you select who will speak for it. Of course, those selected are authentic, and their speech is genuine, but, as Said says, the result is a construction which does violence to complex realities. [3] It is simply not the case that the most extreme views in a movement or society represent the core values while others are counterfeit. One-dimensional Zionism is as misleading as one-dimensional Islam.

**Writing Zionism out of History and History out of Zionism**

Tilley accuses Zionism of appropriating ‘Jewish culture and a history of persecution – especially the moral legacy of the Holocaust – to legitimise ethnic statehood’ (p. 180). Zionism is not considered as one of the possible outcomes of Jewish culture and history but as an appropriation of Jewish culture and history. She also uses the concept of ‘world Jewry’ (pp. 58-9) – the conceptual implication being that we can distinguish Zionism from ‘world Jewry.’

But was Zionism really such an inappropriate response to persecution, an ‘appropriation?’ Consider the actual ‘moral legacy of the Holocaust.’ After the rise of Hitler, no state would take large numbers of Jewish refugees fleeing persecution. Even after the death camps were established there was no change in this policy. Despite repeated requests to Allied governments by Jewish and humanitarian organisations for military action to be taken against the death camps during the
war, there was no such action. And after the Nazis had been defeated, the ‘displaced people’ (Jews) were not offered refuge. Indeed many were massacred after they returned home from the camps. [4] It could be argued that had there been a Jewish state in, say, 1937, many Jewish refugees could have entered it and that the state would have had more influence with the Allies or indeed intervened directly. In short a Jewish state might save Jews from persecution. The non-Jewish world perpetrated these horrors or was unwilling or unable to stop them. The Jewish state was palpably part of the post-war ‘moral legacy’ of the Holocaust.

‘Apartheid Israel’: the poverty of analogy
Bracketing the history of European anti-Semitism, Tilley finds Jewish Israelis to be akin to white South Africans and particularly Afrikaners. For instance, she claims that Israeli discourse frequently draws on images of the ‘vengeful Arab natives seeking Jewish extermination’ (p. 80) while ‘Jewish language about the bloody Arab revenge echoes strongly of identical foreboding about ethnic cleansing and mass murder by Blacks upon any end to apartheid’ (page 60-1). We should notice the use of the world ‘identical.’ Tilley has not grasped that South African apartheid was based on a long history – 350 years – of violent racist dispossession and exclusion (and, it should be noted, not just by the Afrikaner people). However, the South African liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC) founded in 1909, fought for a single unitary and democratic South Africa for all its citizens. The ANC never suggested that the white population were not entitled to be in the country or that they did not have legitimate rights. South African nationalism was open to all irrespective of ethnic origin. South African white ‘foreboding’ was based entirely on racial myths. The Afrikaners – and other whites – had not been recent victims of genocide.

Palestinian nationalism has developed very differently from South African Nationalism. [5] The PLO, when it was formed in the 1960s, wanted to create a ‘democratic secular state’ based on ethnically cleansing the country of all Jews who had arrived after the ‘Zionist invasion.’[6] This remained the policy of the PLO until 1988 (and is contained in the Charter of the newly-powerful Hamas). [7]

At the time the policy of the Palestinian leadership and the Arab world was to oppose the United Nations vote for the creation of two states in Palestine. Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, formally warned the UN that Arab states would use force against any partition plan and
that, ‘This war will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongol massacres and the Crusades.’[8] The most prominent political leader in the Palestinian leadership, Haj Amin Husseini, had collaborated with Hitler during the Second World War – making racist broadcasts from Berlin and organising the Bosnian SS Division. [9] The ANC, in contrast, has been led by two Nobel Peace Prize winners (Lutuli and Mandela) who stood for non-racism and democratic politics. [10] The South African white population did not face the threat of expulsion but the promise of democracy. The Jewish community in Palestine, in the late 1940s, was threatened with a ‘war of extermination’ only two years after Hitler’s mass murder of six million Jews. This rhetoric continued for some decades in speeches and broadcasts by Presidents, Ministers and representatives of the Arab League. The campaign by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to ‘wipe Israel off the map’ in the context of his Holocaust denial ideology has not come out of the blue. And nor can it be said that it does not find a receptive audience amongst some sections of Palestinian society. None of this is in any way is to justify the grotesque stereotyping of Arabs and Palestinians that can be found in some Israeli discourse. However, the idea that Jewish fear of annihilation was, or is, ‘identical’ to white South African fear is grotesque. Jewish fears were rational and not at all an example of what Tilley calls ‘national mytho-history.’

The misleading comparison between South Africa and Israel has re-appeared in the last few years. It had been an integral part of the nasty Soviet anti-Semitic campaign after the 1967 war which equated Zionism with apartheid and Nazism. Contemporary rhetoric about the Israeli wall in the West Bank as an ‘apartheid wall,’ and the recent articles by Chris McGreal in *The Guardian*, [11] represent a new wave of this discourse. The disinvestment vote by the Church of England Synod, and the campaign for an academic boycott, have been underpinned by a series of events in universities dealing with ‘Apartheid Israel.’

Tilley claims that ‘as did early Zionist settlement, white South African settlement, involved expulsions and extensive land seizures’ (p. 136). But this, again, dangerously simplifies history. It is inaccurate to suggest that ‘early Zionist settlement’ produced any expulsions or land seizures. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Jews bought land at market prices. [12] The amount of land purchased was relatively small. At the end of the Ottoman period (1917) Jews owned about two percent of Palestine and by the end of the British Mandate (1948) that figure had grown to six percent – at a time when Jews comprised a third of the population. [13] In contrast, in South Africa during the same period, the Imperial British Parliament passed the Union of
South Africa Act (1909) which created the constitution for a racial dictatorship. In 1913 the South African Parliament put its stamp on nearly 300 years of actual ‘expulsions and extensive land seizures’ by passing the ‘native Land Act’ limiting African ownership to 13.5 percent of the country.

The poverty of keyhole history
In short, Tilley offers a reductive or ‘keyhole’ history. All complexity, contradiction, unintended consequences and tragedy is forced through a single narrow perspective onto the past. The view gained is fundamentally misleading. Zionism, the argument runs, has a racist logic and the occupation is the logical result of Zionism. The various features of the occupation – the check points, the system of passes, the separate road systems for Israelis and Palestinians – are the outward representation of this inner logic. The wall is not seen for what it actually is – an attempt to annex territory – but as a logically ‘Zionist’ effort to ethnically segregate.

In fact, although Israel uses the term ‘separation barrier’ to describe its wall, the ‘separation’ referred to is between Palestine and Israel not between Arabs and Jews. If this were really an apartheid wall there would be no Arabs living on what the Israelis want to make ‘their side.’ But as any opponent of this disgusting construction knows, one of its effects is to divide Palestinian communities. The route ploughs through towns and villages, encircling houses, and sometimes walling off entire Palestinian neighborhoods from the West Bank, separating Palestinians from each other, not Jews from Arabs. It is an attempt at land theft. The International Court of Justice did not mention apartheid or racial segregation in any part of its judgment on the wall.

Settlements and Walls
Tilley does offer a graphic and accurate account of the massive expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In the post-Oslo period Israeli governments have increased their population from 120,000 in 1992 to 260,000 in 2005. To sustain this process Israel has expropriated yet more land for the interconnecting road system. And, in the recent past, the pressure on Palestinian land has been made worse by the building of the hideous and illegal wall. The expanding settlements and the spreading wall have combined to make the check-points all the more permanent. The new Kalundia checkpoint outside Ramallah has all the appearance of an international border post, complete with a flowery logo welcoming those crossing. Tilley is correct that less and less land is controlled by Palestinians and that
Palestinians are more controlled in their movements than at any time in history. She is also right in seeing the occupation as colonial and racist. However, for Tilley, what we see in the West Bank – for Tilley, colonial conquest, ethnic cleansing, settlements and racism – is the inevitable and inescapable result of Zionism. In other words, what is taking place in the West Bank and Gaza is happening because Israel exists, and is unacceptable because Israel is.

However, the legal status of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem was subject to detailed analysis by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the wall. Tilley appears not have read the opinion as she is convinced that:

> no juridical formula in the post 1967 ‘peace process’ provided that the territory ever be turned over to Palestinian sovereignty or suggested that the outcome would be two states (p. 207)

In fact the Court explained that the territory east of the 1949 Green Line is Palestine and that to the West is Israel, explicitly endorsing the roadmap’s ‘two-state solution.’ The court’s well known conclusion that the wall is illegal is not based on the notion that Israel is racist, or that the wall is a product of ‘apartheid’ policies, but on the basis that Israel has no right to any part of Palestinian territory. The opinion says that Israel can build what it wants on the ‘territory of Israel itself’ but not on occupied land – the wall, therefore, has the same illegal status as the settlements. Those settlements may well be a fact but so is Israel’s lack of legal title to them. For Tilley this is irrelevant as they are ‘immoveable.’ She confuses the issue of where the border of a Palestinian state should be with the settlements. If it is the case that they have been built in occupied Palestine surely they are in the same category of the huge number of ‘new towns’ built by the French all across their former North African Territories. The towns are still there but the French settlers – in the case of Algeria over one million – have long gone. And there are other possible solutions. The people could remain and become citizens in a Palestinian state (as contained in the Beilin-Abu Mazen understanding of October 1995) or these areas could be annexed to Israel in exchange for territory of the same area that is currently in Israel (as provided for by the Clinton parameters at Camp David in 2000). The Geneva Accord was accompanied by a detailed map of such land swaps. The point is that Tilley does not consider any of these practical solutions to her immoveable problem. She dismisses the Geneva Accord (pp. 56, 123) but, in truth the Geneva Accord was the product of a great deal of serious negotiations between
Israelis and Palestinians determined to prove that a genuine and just solution was possible.

Tilley wrote her book after the Gaza disengagement was announced but before it was effected. However, she does not appreciate the immense significance of the public debate within Israel about the removal of settlers. Once the government announced the plan a taboo was broken. Up to April 2004 the settler movement, and their powerful and often ministerial backers such as, ironically, Ariel Sharon, had been able to veto debate about their status. However once the plan was announced – and then carried through – it created a precedent; settlers can be moved. It also established something else: it was up to the Palestinians to decide what to do with the buildings. The Israelis destroyed the buildings as a result of agreements with the Palestinian National Authority. The Gaza disengagement showed that withdrawal from occupied lands is quite possible for an Israeli government – if there is a will to do so.

Tilley ignores all this. She argues that the West Bank settlements are of ‘symbolic value for Israel’s nationalist and religious right wing’ (p. 56) and, as a result, any policy of moving settlers ‘underappreciates the dangers of this plan for Jewish-Zionist unity which no Israeli government has any motive to risk’ (p 56). The problem with Tilley’s argument is clear. Of course ‘Israel’s right-wing and nationalist right’ see the settlements as of ‘symbolic value’ – but they are just one faction within Israeli society, and not a majority faction by any means. In the 2005 disengagement struggle what was noticeable was the division in Israeli society, not its unity. Moreover, as can be seen since the formation of Kadima, the forces of the Nationalist and religious right, while significant, are not at all mainstream – opinion polls predict the pro-settler movement alliance of the former National Union and National Religious Party to win 8-9 percent of the vote only. Even if you were to add the vote of the Likud rump to this score it is barely more than 20 percent. [18]

The tenacity with which the Sharon government pursued Gaza disengagement was the marker of an important political dynamic that Tilley just does not recognise. Anyone familiar with the politics of Israel will find the concept of ‘Jewish-Zionist unity’ rather problematic given the history of political (and at times military) conflict within Zionism, the pre-State Yishuv, and Israel itself. Indeed the term ‘Jewish-Zionist unity’ implies a Big Brother consciousness that dominates an entire society forcing it to act as one. Moreover, if ‘Jewish-Zionist unity’ really does prevent any change in the status of the settlements why on earth would it not
be an obstacle to the dissolution of the Jewish state itself (a necessity for the One State solution)?

‘Pass Laws’
It is through this problematic history that the present is read: Israel is Apartheid South Africa. For example, the check points are treated as identical to apartheid’s well known pass laws. However, consider the differences. The purpose of the South African system of ‘influx control’ was to regulate the flow of cheap labor and to keep the different ethnic groups territorially divided. Israel is using the checkpoints and the passes as part of the mechanism of occupation. It is motivated by military policy which also has the result of fragmenting and weakening Palestinian society and obstructing the development of a normal national life. In this Israel acts like all occupying powers – illegal and unacceptable but the result of the occupation, not of an attempt to impose a racial dictatorship. This is not to say the Palestinians are not victims of racism in their dealings with the occupying power; they are. Colonial occupations breed racism everywhere. Centuries of British colonial occupations has given Britain a bequest of xenophobia and racism. Britain is not an apartheid society, however. Ultimately, the apartheid model is simply not convincing. As Edward Said wrote, ‘Israeli Jews are not the white settlers of the stripe that colonised Algeria and South Africa.’ [19]

The Holocaust and the Law of Return
In Tilley’s portrayal of Israel as an ‘apartheid society’ the 1950 Law of Return figures highly: ‘these elaborate legal provisions signal the care with which Israeli law guards the Jewish identity and its major package of rights and privileges’ (p. 179). Simplistic, again. Tilley ignores the fact that the categories of persons referred to in the Law of Return correspond to those whose connection with the Jewish community would have resulted in Nazi persecution. The law provides not only for Jews (defined as ‘the child of a Jewish mother with a Jewish mother’) but also for the child or grandchild of a Jew, and for their spouses, to migrate to and become citizens of Israel. It should be pointed out that the spouses and children are not Jewish. To frame the law as conferring ‘privileges’ while its original purpose was to remedy oppression is not useful. There is a vigorous debate in Israel about the character of the law in the conditions of the 21st century.
1947 and the legacy of the Arab rejection of Partition

As well as ignoring the historical context of the Law of Return, Tilley also skips over the event which paved the way for it, the 1947 UN partition resolution. United Nations General Assembly resolution 181 was adopted after months of work by the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine. Its majority report proposed the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, and an international area comprising the 205,000 people who lived in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. While much has been made of the fact that the UN plan allocated more land area to the Jewish state than to the Arab state (54 percent to 44 percent), the plan did not envisage any movement of populations between the states (Tilley’s account of the plan ignores this [p. 77]), all existing property rights were to be guaranteed and an economic union was proposed. The partition plan was not based on ethnic cleansing or expulsions such as had accompanied the partition of India in the same year. In the Jewish state the population of roughly 500,000 Jews and 420,000 Palestinians were to have equal rights as would the 750,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Jews in the Arab state. [20] The Zionist movement accepted the plan and the Palestinians and the Arab world rejected it.

In accepting the partition plan the Zionist movement accepted that a large and permanent Arab population would be in the ‘Jewish’ state. Had partition been implemented under international supervision, as intended, the subsequent history may have been very different – subsequent Israeli state formation and relations between Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians have been shaped by the 1948 rejection.

However, in narrating aspects of the creation of Israel in 1948 Tilley’s history constructs a one-dimensional Zionist conspiracy. ‘Less well remembered,’ she says ‘is the Zionist strategy behind the seeming spirit of compromise’ (p. 78). We are told that in the 1930s and 1940s there were many Zionist conferences which debated the wisdom of partition. True. But what she fails to tell her readers is that the Zionist movement accepted a briefly-offered British plan for a Jewish state on 20 percent of Palestine in 1937. And she omits the vast range of views in the Zionist movement as to what Jewish self-determination might constitute. [21] She does not mention that until 1948 the influential left-wing party MAPAM (United Workers Party) [22] sought a bi-national state – as did many other factions and individuals. Tilley introduces some of these figures (Martin Buber and Judah Magnes) towards the end of her book implying that they were not Zionists. They were.
The rejection of the United Nations partition plan by the Palestinians and Arab states was quite understandable; however, the threats and then the use of force against the Charter of the United Nations were not. Armed force by irregular militias and regular armies from late 1947 created conditions which lead to full scale war in May 1948, when Israel was created. It was during this 1947-8 period that 700,000 Palestinians became refugees. Some 200,000 left before Israel's Declaration of Independence. In the dominant discourse within Israel this tragedy is presented as if Israel has no responsibility for it. However, the new Israeli historians [23] (and on this question in particular, Benny Morris) [24] have detailed the evidence of massacres, forced removals and other horrors faced by Palestinian civilians. In today’s parlance many of these events could be described as ‘ethnic cleansing’ (and Tilley does so). The vigorous debate in Israel on the origins of the state and its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem is an indication that the pluralist society that has been created is attempting to grapple with foundational issues. This is in marked contrast to the low priority such debates have had in the United States, for example, where genocidal acts were for a long period celebrated in popular culture.

Tilley is absolutely right to draw attention to the need for justice for the Palestinian refugees, who must be part of any settlement. The case for financial compensation and the right to return to a Palestinian state are widely agreed although this issue does not assume the priority it ought in current international initiatives such as the Roadmap. The major division between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators until now has been the Israel’s unwillingness to accept any degree of responsibility for the plight of the refugees and the issue of a more general ‘right to return.’ However, as the Abu Mazen-Beilin understanding and the Camp David parameters indicate, the issue here is as much of tone as of substance and could be solved in the context of a two state solution. [25]

**Mutual Recognition, Mutual Respect**

In developing her postnationalist argument for the ‘One State Solution’ Tilley’s tone can be hectoring. The traumatic history of both Jews and Palestinians – as peoples whose national movements have been formed in response to oppression – is unappreciated. She tends to assume that there are clearly established Western liberal democratic values which are superior to the values of peoples struggling for self-determination.
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Tilley is light-minded when discussing her alternative vision. She occasionally recommends the constitutional model of the United States but also uses the terms ‘democratic secular state’ and ‘bi-national state’ interchangeably. These two (competing) concepts have a very specific content and imply rather different constitutional orders. The first would be a unitary state while the second would be highly devolved, perhaps on the Belgian model. Tilley’s carelessness as regards the specific polities that each would create goes hand in hand with a rather poor assessment of the political dynamics of both Israeli and Palestinian societies. In the latter case she completely underestimates the role of political Islam, describing Hamas as a ‘minority twist in the national movement’ (p. 2003). At the same time, in her effort to portray Israeli society as irredeemable racist, she ignores the lively Israeli-Palestinian political scene and the impact of Israeli human rights organisations in combating discrimination. For example, Supreme Court President Aharon Barak’s explanation of why the current government’s education plan is illegal is an encouraging sign of progress on this front: ‘the national priority zones [do] not sit well with the principle of equality, as its consequences lead to unacceptable discrimination against the Arab sector.’ [26]

Both Israeli and Palestinian societies are highly developed and distinct. The conflict is about the co-existence of these national identities. The solution remains self-determination based on compromise and mutual recognition. Conflict-resolution requires each people to feel secure and confident. Proposing their elimination does quite the opposite. And, whatever the intentions, this is what The One-State Solution does. As such it joins a genre of literature and political discourse which circulates the image of an illegitimate Israel. This view is often based, as we have seen, on inaccurate history, inappropriate analogies and selective citations. No doubt in many instances this approach is thought to be supportive of the Palestinian cause. It is, in my view, quite the opposite. The luxury of an ideological debate rooted essentially in the Cold War might be fine in the seminar rooms of North America and Europe. However, for Palestinians and Israelis it is a diversion. Critical choices face the two peoples in the aftermath of both the Palestinian and Israeli elections. The most critical choice is whether each side can recognise the legitimacy of the other to exist on equal terms. The rejection of Israel’s right to exist, or at best grudging acceptance, has left Palestine more vulnerable and not more secure. Israel’s refusal to negotiate with the Palestinians on the basis of creating a viable sovereign state, equal with Israel in every way, has left Israel on a war footing for six decades.
Supporters of peace in the Middle East need to make clear that both national movements, and the complex societies that they have formed, are permanent features of the Middle East. Any suggestion that one side or the other ought to depart from the scene plays into the hands of those who have an interest in perpetuating the conflict. The current Israeli government needs to know that its plan for a small and weak Palestinian state on 60 percent of the West Bank and Gaza (based on the annexation of East Jerusalem, the settlement blocks and parts of the Jordan Valley) is unjust, illegal and a recipe for endless conflict. A Hamas-led government, if it continues to refuse to recognise Israel’s legitimacy, will only prolong the misery of occupation and dispossession and encourage the Olmert government to take a unilateral approach. Israelis in the elections are likely to elect a clear majority of Knesset members who will support the principle of a Palestinian state. This will be a unique political moment that should be not be squandered. Together with real efforts by the Quartet and particularly the United States Administration, movement on the ground is possible. Israelis and Palestinians in large numbers favor a two state solution and that is what they both deserve. Having got their own states both Israelis and Palestinians will have the power in their own hands and it will be up to them how they fashion their futures.

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References


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**Notes**

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[22] It was the second largest Zionist party in the 1940s.