In *The Question of Zion*, Jacqueline Rose seeks to characterise Zionism as a collective mental disorder induced by centuries of Jewish suffering. [1] She proposes to subject it to psychoanalysis in order to reveal the manner in which the trauma of persecution in diaspora led to the displacement of rage, shame, and helplessness onto innocent Palestinian victims who had no part in the European abuse to which Israelis have been responding in the course of their history. She invites us to see Jewish settlement in pre-State Palestine, the creation of Israel, and much of contemporary Israeli society as the fruits of a political movement that internalised the violence to which Jews were subjected in Europe and fashioned it into an engine for dispossessing the Palestinians.

The book consists of three chapters. The first argues that Zionism should be understood as an expression of Jewish messianism and attempts to construe it as a modern descendent of the seventeenth century false messiah Shabtai Zvi. The second applies a psychoanalytic perspective to Zionist thinkers and their ideas. The third treats Zionism, Israeli politics, and Israel’s relations with the Palestinians as largely determined by repressed emotional responses to the Jewish experience of impotence in the face of the Holocaust and the history of oppression in Europe that preceded it.

**Problems of Scholarship**

Rose’s book exhibits a remarkable lack of familiarity with the most basic elements of Jewish culture and Zionist history. She relies heavily (in fact almost exclusively) on a few influential secondary sources to support her far-reaching assertions. Her account of messianism is cribbed (unsuccessfully) from Gershom Scholem’s two monumental studies, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, (Schocken Books, 1954) and *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah*, Princeton University Press, 1973). For her understanding of Herzl (as well as most of the quotes she cites from his work) she turns to Amos Elon’s biography *Herzl* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975). The writings of major Zionist thinkers (Leon Pinsker, Ahad Haam, Martin Buber, Chaim Weizmann, and others) are accessed primarily through anthologies and
studies done by other scholars. There is little evidence of any sustained critical encounter with the writings of the people whose ideas and lives she evaluates.

The absence of substantial scholarship in Rose’s book leads to some stunning if elementary errors of fact which bring into question the seriousness of the research on which she bases her conclusions. To get a sense of the abyss of informational deficit into which the book plunges it is worth briefly enumerating a few of these mistakes.

Rose describes Shabtai Zvi, in an address to a synagogue in Smyrna, as having ‘announced that the Pentateuch was holier than the Torah’ (p. 2). She follows Scholem in emphasising Shabtai Zvi’s manic depression as a significant factor in his messianic delusions. However, if Shabtai Zvi did, in fact, make the announcement that she attributes to him, then her concerns for his state of mind should be of a more fundamental order. *Pentateuch* is the Greek term for the Torah, the five books of Moses. Shabtai Zvi would, of course, be well aware of this, and so, on Rose’s version of his address, he was recommending the embrace of a flat contradiction. Presumably she intends to say that Shabtai Zvi declared that a higher mystical messianic code supersedes the commandments of the *Halacha* (Jewish written and oral law), as in Scholem’s original account of his career.

Rose presents Maimonides as opposing messianism (‘When Maimonides tried to abolish messianism as a historical force...’ p. 19). In fact Maimonides formulates belief in the coming of the Messiah as the twelfth of his thirteen principles of faith, which provide a credo of essential Jewish religious beliefs. In the *Mishneh Torah*, his codification of Halachic principles, he devotes two sections (*Halachot Melachim ve-Milchamot, perek yud alef* and *perek yud bet*) to a description of the messianic era. One of his main concerns in this discussion is to emphasise that this era will occur in real historical time, and it will not be distinguished by miracles or supernatural events. It will be a time of national and religious redemption for the Jewish people, and universal peace and justice for all the nations of the world. Rose has failed to distinguish messianism as a general belief in redemption and a redeemer, which Maimonides insists upon, from a mystical concept of the messianic role derived from the Kabbalah, which he avoids. It is the latter notion that Scholem has analysed so masterfully, but this distinction gets lost when Rose lifts her account of Shabtai Zvi from his work.
In two cases authors are resurrected to make posthumous remarks. Rose says of Herzl “To his first biographer Reuben Brainin in 1919, he describes this dream he had at the age of twelve’ (p. 29). Quoting Jabotinsky she tells us “Of all the necessities of national rebirth,” Jabotinsky stated in 1947, “shooting is the most important of all.” (p. 124). [2] Given that Herzl died in 1904 and Jabotinsky in 1940, it seems that Rose has moved beyond psychoanalysis into parapsychology. In both cases she has confused the publication date of the work in which the statement appears with the time of its utterance.

Rose’s assault on accuracy does have the virtue of being non-partisan. The Bund (the Jewish socialist labour organisation) fares no better than the religious or Zionist victims of her misinformation. She describes the Bund as ‘the group of socialist Jews virulently opposed to Jewish nationalism.’ (p. 123). Not quite. The Bund was certainly anti-Zionist, but it was clearly committed to a nationalist politics. It envisaged Jewish cultural and political autonomy in the diaspora within the framework of a general socialist revolution. It regarded the Jews as a nation whose proletariat would participate in this revolution on equal terms with the working classes of other nations. Its insistence on a national approach to the Jewish role in building socialism was the reason that Lenin engineered its expulsion from the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party at its 1903 conference in London. The Bund was subsequently suppressed and persecuted by the Bolsheviks and their allies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Hebrew language is also not safe from Rose’s dangerous attentions. The Edah Haredit, an ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, is misnamed ‘Edah Herudit’ (p. 32). The Bilu (acronym for Beit Yaakov Lechu ve-Nelcha, House of Jacob Come and let us Go), an early Russian student Zionist group that immigrated to Palestine in the 1880s, turns up as ‘Bilau’ (p. 176, footnote 157). Graduating from typographical distortion to a bold foray into the historical linguistics of modern Israeli Hebrew, she observes that nouns like ha’apalah (to make a great effort to ascend, and illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine in the period of the British White Paper), and bitahon (security) have religious meanings in traditional Jewish texts as well as standard secular uses. She concludes from this fact that “The language of secular Zionism bears traces and scars of a messianic narrative that it barely seeks, or fails to repress.” (pp. 42-3). The problem with this otherwise compelling derivation of the contemporary Israeli Hebrew lexicon from messianic sources is that many of the straightforwardly non-religious uses of these terms date back to the sacred texts themselves, in particular, the Bible and the Mishna, where they denote properties,
events, and objects of daily life. Jews in these periods were no less in need of a natural language with the lexical resources to express worldly phenomena than are their Israeli counterparts today.

Moreover, the revival of Hebrew as a secular language has its origins in the beginning of the Haskalah (Jewish enlightenment movement) in Germany and Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, with the appearance of Hebrew literary and political periodicals. Many early Hebraists (and even some later ones) were not Zionists, and many Zionists were Yiddishists rather than Hebraists. In fact there were language wars until shortly before the establishment of the State, within the socialist Zionist labour movement, between advocates of Hebrew and of Yiddish as the national language. The re-establishment of Hebrew as a national language was part of a general movement of secular Jewish culture that sought to free Jewish life from the dominance of religious institutions and observances.

Misrepresentations are inflicted even on comparatively recent historical events. Rose writes, ‘…in response to the refusal of the European countries, Russia, and the United States to move their embassies to Jerusalem after Israel took over the whole city in 1967...’ (p. 152).

Russia (the Soviet Union), at least, had an unassailable reason for not wanting to move its embassy to Jerusalem at the time, given that it, together with all other East European Communist countries except for Romania, broke diplomatic relations with Israel immediately after the 1967 war, restoring them only in 1987. These are the sorts of mistakes that publishing companies normally use external reviewers to filter out. It would be interesting to know which reviewers (if any) Princeton University Press entrusted with the task of evaluating Rose’s manuscript.

Setting aside the quality of the book’s scholarship, I will take up what I understand to be its main arguments.

**Zionism and Messianism**

In chapter 1 Rose motivates her claim that Zionism is a political descendent of Jewish messianism by correctly describing the programme of Gush Emunim (the religious settlers organisation) for creating settlements in the occupied territories as the means for realising its avowedly messianic view of the relationship between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. She then attempts to support the additional
assertion that the roots of this view are inherent in the secular Zionist movement that created the State.

Her primary evidence for this latter conclusion is the fact that secular Zionist leaders frequently used redemptive language to describe their project. For example, she quotes the following passages from Ben Gurion’s book *Israel: A Personal History* (1972, New English Library, London):

> Without a messianic, emotional, ideological impulse, without the vision of restoration and redemption, there is no earthly reason why even oppressed and underprivileged Jews ... should wander off to Israel of all places.... The immigrants were seized with an immortal vision of the redemption which became the principal motivation for their lives. (pp. 25-6)

However, while Gush Emunim is, by its own account, inspired by a messianic programme of the most explicit kind, Rose does not succeed in showing that secular Zionism is derived from the same roots. Nationalist leaders often apply ecstatic religious rhetoric and invoke the glories of an ancient past in promoting their political visions, particularly when they regard themselves as agents of a struggle for national liberation. Consider, for example, these comments from Michael Collins’ defence of the Irish Free State.

> Let us advance and use these liberties to make Ireland a shining light in a dark world, to reconstruct our ancient civilization on modern lines, to avoid the errors, the miseries, the dangers, into which other nations, with their false civilizations, have fallen. [3]

He [Thomas Davis] saw that unless we were Gaels we were not a nation. When he thought of the nation he thought of the men and women of the nation. He knew that unless they were free, Ireland could not be free, and to fill them again with pride in their nation he sang to them of the old splendour of Ireland, of their heroes, of their language, of the strength of unity, of the glory of noble strife, of the beauties of the land, of the delights and richness of the Gaelic life.

A nationality founded in the hearts and intelligence of the people would bid defiance to the arms of the foe and guile of the traitor. The first step to nationality is the open and deliberate recognition of it by the people
themselves. Once the Irish people declare the disconnection of themselves, their feelings, and interests from the men, feelings, and interests of England, they are in march for freedom.

That was the true National Gospel. 'Educate that you may be free,' he said. 'It was only by baptism at the fount of Gaelicism that we would get the strength and ardour to fit us for freedom.' [4]

Similarly, Marcus Garvey, leader of the black nationalist Back To Africa movement in Jamaica and America made these comments in an address.

May we not say to ourselves that the doctrine Jesus taught – that of redeeming mankind – is the doctrine we ourselves must teach in the redemption of our struggling race? Let us therefore cling fast to the great ideal we have before us. This time it is not the ideal of redeeming the world, such as was the ideal of Jesus, but it is the ideal of redeeming and saving 400,000,000 souls who have suffered for centuries from the persecution of alien races. As Christ by His teachings, His sufferings and His death, triumphed over His foes, through the resurrection, so do we hope that out of our sufferings and persecutions of today we will triumph in the resurrection of our newborn race. [5]

In moving directly from Shabtai Zvi to Zionism Rose completely disregards the historical context within which Zionism emerged as a modern political movement. In fact, Zionism was an integral part of the political ferment that affected central and Eastern European Jewry in the latter half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century – one in a diverse range of ideological responses to the dire threats that emerged to Jewish survival and continuity in Europe during this period. The main competitors with which it jostled for support included Bundism, Communism, territorialism (a movement to create a Jewish state in a territory other than Palestine), folkism (the proposal to sustain culturally autonomous secular Jewish communities in the diaspora), and liberal assimilationism. The advocates of these ideologies conducted a lively, and often raucous debate over which approach offered the best solution to the anomalies and dangers of Jewish life in the fast disintegrating conditions of the European diaspora.

The proposals offered by the non/anti-Zionist movements, particularly the Communists and the Bundists, were, in general, formulated in terms no less radical and utopian than those of the Zionists. At the beginning of the last century Zionism
was one among many movements trying to cope with an increasingly hostile environment. That it succeeded in realising its programme where the others failed is due largely to a series of historical events over which the Jews had no control, most prominent among them the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazi genocide, and the systematic repression of robust Jewish life of any kind in the Soviet Union.

The diversity of approach within the Zionist movement was as great as that which characterised the more general Jewish political spectrum from which it emerged. Religious Zionists, Marxists, socialists of every orientation, liberals, binationalists seeking a federated Jewish-Arab state, non-statist cultural Zionists, right wing nationalists, and general (non-partisan) Zionists competed for power within the Zionist Organization and the institutions of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in pre-State Palestine). Rose acknowledges some of these differences but passes over others which are central to understanding the nature of the movement.

A particularly important controversy that she misses is the conflict between Herzl and Nordau's culturally neutral brand of purely political Zionism and the secular cultural nationalism of Weizmann and his supporters within the Democratic Faction. The former wished to specify the Zionist enterprise solely as a programme for creating a state for Jews, free of any commitment to the cultural identity of that state. Weizmann and the practical Zionists argued that Zionism was a movement of national liberation that could only succeed if it created a new secular Jewish culture with Hebrew at its core. This split involved dimensions of class, cultural geography, and political priorities. It placed the central European bourgeois liberals on Herzl's side, with the working class and student activists of Eastern Europe in the Democratic Faction. The political Zionists emphasised diplomatic activity to obtain an internationally recognised charter for Jewish settlement and statehood as the primary initial objective. By contrast, the practical Zionists of the Democratic Faction stressed immigration and the construction of Jewish institutions on the ground in Palestine. Although Weizmann was a political liberal rather than a socialist, the socialist Zionists quickly became the dominant part of his coalition.

An interesting aspect of this argument, and one that is crucial to appreciating the relationship of Zionism to religious messianism, is the role that the Mizrachi – the main religious Zionist group – played within it. The Mizrachi strongly supported Herzl’s political Zionism because it saw the militant secularism of the Democratic Faction as a threat to its Orthodox religious beliefs. Its members regarded the Mizrachi as a bridging organisation that permitted them to participate in a
secular political movement without compromising their religious commitments. The members of the Democratic Faction pursued an anti-clericalist agenda and regarded Zionism as the vanguard of the cultural as well as the political liberation of the Jewish people. [6]

As a consequence of its desire to limit Zionism to a minimal political strategy for achieving security and sovereignty, the Mizrachi was historically moderate and pragmatic on issues of territory. In fact, it endorsed Herzl’s advocacy of the Uganda plan, presented to the 1905 Zionist Congress, for Jewish settlement in British East Africa as an alternative to Palestine. [7] The Democratic Faction opposed the plan on the grounds that the Jews had no connection with East Africa, and Palestine is the only historically viable Jewish homeland. In 1947 the Mizrachi ultimately supported Ben Gurion in his acceptance of the UN partition plan, while secular parties of the Yishuv on both the left and the right opposed it for a variety of reasons.

In 1900 a coalition of leading Orthodox rabbis published Or La-Yesharim (Light for the Righteous), a collection of articles that constitute a declaration against Zionism as a heresy and a violation of the principles of Torah-based Judaism. Luz (1988) points out that it was the first time in sixty years that the rival religious schools of Hasidism and Mitnagdim had joined forces to oppose a modernising movement. In the previous case they had cooperated in resisting the Haskalah. [8] In Or La-Yesharim they identify Zionism as an extension of the Haskalah and the secularist threat to religious Judaism.

The Gush Emunim settlers whom Rose presents as expressions of the messianic nature of Zionism are disciples of Rabbi Abraham Issac Kook (first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the Yishuv under the British Mandate), rather than Rabbi Issac Jacob Reines, who founded the Mizrachi (in 1901). In sharp contrast to Reines, Rabbi Kook was indeed a Kabbalistic messianist who saw Jewish settlement in Palestine as a prelude to the messianic era. [9] He was also an opponent of the Mizrachi, which he criticised for its participation in a secular movement, and he expressed sympathy for Agudat Yisrael, the leading representative of anti-Zionist Orthodoxy. [10] The transformation of the Mizrachi from an anti-messianic, pragmatic political party into a vehicle for extreme religious nationalism and messianism started after the 1967 war, and was completed in the period following the 1973 war. As many observers in Israel have pointed out, the messianists have discarded classical Zionist politics for a millenarian programme which is its effective antithesis. The extent to
which the messianist view was foreign to classical Zionist thought and Israeli policy is revealed in this observation of Amos Elon:

Latter-day Israeli intransigence sometimes makes even knowledgeable people nowadays forget – or wish to repress retrospectively – the crucial fact that Israel originally accepted the internationalization of Jerusalem as well as the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel abandoned its support of internationalization only in the aftermath of the failed attempt by Jordanian and Egyptian expeditionary forces to bleed to death and conquer West Jerusalem in the war of 1948. After that war until 1967 every Israeli government without exception recognized and was reconciled with the principle and practice of partition in Jerusalem as well as in Palestine as a whole. The secret deliberations of the Israeli government between 1948 and 1951 are now open to the public and fully bear out the contention that nobody in power during the first nineteen months of the state thought that West Jerusalem should be Israel’s capital. [11]

The Orthodox Jewish thinker Yeshayahu Leibowitz provides one of the clearest instances of the radical disjunction between classical political Zionism and religious messianism. Leibowitz endorses Zionism unequivocally as a necessary strategy for achieving political independence in the interest of Jewish survival and security. He argues that the movement and the state that it created are purely secular instruments without religious significance. Throughout his long career as a public figure he sustained vociferous opposition to militarism and the occupation of the territories, frequently clashing sharply with the political leadership of the country. He warned against endowing the State with any notion of sacredness, and he described the settlers’ movement as a form of idolatry that substitutes the veneration of land for the religious values of Judaism. He supported soldiers who refused to serve in the territories, and he characterised the occupation of these territories as the greatest threat to Israel’s survival as a democracy and a Jewish state. He also called for the separation of religion and state as a necessary condition for preserving the integrity of Judaism. Unsurprisingly, Rose makes no mention of Leibowitz’s influential role as a voice of dissent in Israeli politics and public life. [12]

Rose’s claim that Zionism derives from Jewish messianism is, then, not simply false, but radically so. Historically Zionism emerged as part of a more general secularist revolt against religious orthodoxy. It defined itself as a movement committed to the political liberation of the Jewish people within a national homeland in Israel/
Palestine, and it formulated this objective in practical political terms. That Rose so drastically misconstrues the ideological nature of Zionism is a direct result of her insistence on considering it without any reference to its history and the broader social context in which it developed. This bizarrely anti-historical approach seems, in turn, to be driven by a determination to address her topic on the basis of a guiding political agenda rather than a concern with the facts.

Amateur Psychoanalysis of a Political Movement

Rose's project of subjecting a political movement and the collectivity within which it developed to psychoanalysis is seriously misconceived in that it lacks any clear basis in the analytic methods that Freud applied to individuals. The result is free floating jargon, confused abuse of clinical terminology, and amateurish speculation. Her attempt to characterise Zionism as the product of a severe national neurosis is couched in a dense thicket of psychobabble that produces posturing gems of self-parody like the following.

For Lacan, far from aiming to raise the unconscious into the realm of the all-knowing ego, which believes itself to be the sole measure of the universe, psychoanalysis should expose any such mastery as delusion. The “I” (no Ego) should cede before the unpredictable movements, the intangible processes, of the unconscious. Strachey’s formula tries to normalize the mind. The ego, like the normal nation, carves out its identity. Buber quite explicitly makes the link: “The typical individual of our times,” he wrote in his 1939 lecture “The Spirit of Israel and the World of Today,” “holds fast to his expanded ego, his nation.” Similarly Hans Kohn would argue that Zionism, which should have offered a new model of nationhood, has fallen prey to the “naïve and self-limited egoism of sacred faith.” The nation should not be normal. Instead of owning others or itself, instead of battening down, fixing itself, knowing and owning too much, let it slip between analogies: the spirit, Buber writes, should build the life “like a dwelling or like flesh.” [italics in the original] (pp. 73-4)

To the extent that there is a coherent line of argument in this part of the book, it appears to be that Zionism has irreparably compromised the soul of the Jewish people through seeking to normalise its historical conditions by turning it into a nation among the other nations of the world. She cites the warnings that cultural Zionists like Ahad Haam, and members of the binationalist Brit Shalom (and its
successor the Ichud), in particular, Martin Buber and Gershom Scholem, issued against the serious consequences of the normalising project of political Zionism. She understands these as the urgent advice of anguished house psychoanalysts warning their patient of the acute dangers involved in seeking the physical trappings of political sovereignty. She approvingly paraphrases Buber as saying ‘...by the mere fact of becoming a normal nation, it will corrupt its inner life and not survive.’(p. 71, italics in the original).

Rose’s passionate advocacy of a higher spiritual form of Jewish life lived apart from the conditions enjoyed by other national groups is strangely convergent on the attitudes of ultra-Orthodox opponents of Zionism, who regard it as a betrayal of Jewish religious values. However, unlike the ultra-Orthodox, her concern for the integrity of Jewish spirituality and culture does not seem to extend to a rejection of resolutely secular anti-Zionist Jewish movements, like the Bund and the Jewish Communists in their time, or radical assimilationists, all of whom were also striving for Jewish normalcy through alternative political programmes.

Rose represses the role of historical context in shaping the evolution of Zionism and the Yishuv. This prevents her from seeing the acute irony in citing an address given by Buber in 1939 on the dangers that political Zionism poses to Jewish spirituality. Even at that late date Buber was not able to anticipate the terrible events that were about to befall the Jews of Europe, whom he had left behind for the relative safety of Palestine. She, by contrast, has the full benefit of hindsight. At times the book’s shrill insistence on Zionism’s corruption of the Jewish soul, combined with its apparent lack of concern for the survival of the Jewish body in the face of an extreme threat recalls Gandhi’s recommendation to the Jews of Europe in 1938 that they resist Nazism through non-violence. But while Gandhi was guilty only of naiveté and a failure of imagination in comparing the oppression of British colonialism with the dangers posed by the Nazi regime, Rose has access to the complete historical record. The desperation with which Jews sought to immigrate to Palestine in the 1930s was not an expression of Zionist ideology but of the basic need to survive. Britain, North America, and Australia had closed their gates to most of these immigrants, and they were left with little choice. Palestinian Arab hostility to this immigration may have been the understandable reaction of a people concerned to sustain national hegemony over the territory in which they lived (although at least some of this opposition led to unsavoury collaboration with the Nazis), but it was none the less deadly for this.
Rose admires Scholem as a member of Brit Shalom and a critic of the nationalist excesses of political Zionism. But she neglects to point out the development of his views in light of the Nazi genocide, and in response to the intransigence of Palestinian Arab leaders who refused to accept any form of accommodation with an organised Jewish political presence in Palestine, rejecting binationalism, a proposal for a federal system of autonomous Jewish and Arab cantons, and at least two partition plans. [13] In 1946 Scholem wrote to Hannah Arendt criticising her article ‘Zionism Reconsidered,’ *(Menorah Journal 1945)*:

I am a nationalist and wholly unmoved by ostensibly “progressive” denunciations of a viewpoint that people repeatedly, even in my earliest youth, deemed obsolete. I believe in what can be called, in human terms, the “eternity” of anti-Semitism. Nor can any of the clever inquiries into the roots of anti-Semitism ever prevent it from generating new crusades in perpetually new constellations. I am a “sectarian” and have never been ashamed of expressing in print my conviction that sectarianism can offer us something decisive and positive. I don’t give a rap about the problem of the state, because I do not believe that the renewal of the Jewish people depends on the questions of their political or even social organisation. My own political credo is, if anything, anarchistic. But I cannot blame the Jews if they ignore so-called progressive theories which no one else in the world has ever practised. Even though I have a clear notion of the vast differences between partition and a binational state, I would vote with the same heavy heart for either of these two solutions. Yet you make fun of both with truly astonishing ignorance. The Arabs have not agreed to a single solution that includes Jewish immigration, whether it be federal, national, or binational. I am convinced that the conflict with the Arabs would be far easier to deal with after a fait accompli such as partition than it would be without it. In any event, I have no idea of how the Zionists could go about obtaining an agreement with the Arabs, even though each and every one of us came to this country without any agreement – and if we were still on the outside waiting to enter the country, we would still be prepared to come. Unfortunately, it is by no means idiotic when Zionist politicians declare that, given the sabotage efforts made by the British administration, there is no chance of reaching any kind of understanding, however formulated. Certainly as an old Brit Shalom follower, I myself have heard the precise opposite argued. But I am not presumptuous enough to think that the politics of Brit Shalom wouldn’t have found precisely the same Arab opponents, who are primarily interested
not in the morality of our political convictions but in whether or not we are in Palestine at all. [...] I consider it abundantly obvious (and I hardly need emphasize this to you) that the political career of Zionism within this exclusively reactionary world of ours has created a situation full of despair, doubt, and compromise – precisely because it takes place on earth, not on the moon. About this I have no illusions whatsoever. The Zionist movement shares this dialectical experience of the Real (and all of its catastrophic possibilities) with all other movements that have taken it upon themselves to change something in the real world.

And if I may duly and respectfully mention this as well, the cynicism with which you used lofty and progressive arguments against something that is for the Jewish people of life-or-death importance is unlikely to persuade me to abandon the sect. I never dreamed that it would be easier for me to agree with Ben Gurion than with you! But after reading your essay, I have no doubt about this. I consider Ben Gurion’s political line disastrous, but at the same time it’s much more noble – or a lesser evil – than the one we would have if we followed your advice. [14]

The zeal with which Rose is determined to paint Zionism as the offspring of psychological deformation reaches a peak of lurid silliness in a particularly clumsy piece of invention. She writes:

According to one story it was the same Paris performance of Wagner, when without knowledge or foreknowledge of each other they [Herzl and Hitler] were both present on the same evening, that inspired Herzl to write Judenstaat, and Hitler Mein Kampf. (pp. 64-5).

Needless to say, no references, date, or evidence is presented to support the truth of this unlikely ‘story.’ However, its intention is unambiguous. It clearly suggests that the founders of political Zionism and of Nazism were inspired by the same demonic impulses and dangerous romantic myths that Wagner expresses in his music.

While Rose feels compelled to imagine unattested coincidences, she ignores actual historical connections that are both intriguing and relevant to her concerns. Freud and Herzl lived several doors away from each other on the Berggasse in Vienna (Freud at number 19 and Herzl at number 6). Although there is no evidence that they met, Freud was very much aware of Herzl. He appears to have had a more
positive view of Herzl’s political activities than Rose does. He attended some of his plays and, in September 1902, he sent him a copy of the *Interpretation of Dreams*, together with a letter that concluded with the sentence, ‘I don’t know if you will find the book suited to the purpose which Mr. Nordau had in mind, but I beg you to keep it in any case as a token of the high esteem in which for years now I and so many others have held the writer and fighter for the human rights of our people.’ [15]

As has been pointed out many times in the past, Freud was highly sceptical of nationalism in general and Jewish nationalism in particular. However, like Scholem, his views seem to have evolved in response to the rise of Nazism. In 1935 Freud wrote to L. Jaffe of the Keren Ha-Yesod, the funding agency of the World Zionist Organization,

> I well know how great and blessed an instrument this foundation has become in its endeavour to establish a new home in the ancient land of our fathers. It is a sign of our invincible will to survive which has, until now, successfully defied two thousand years of severe oppression! Our youth will continue the struggle. [16]

There are many serious criticisms that one can reasonably bring against Zionism as a political movement. However, in her insistence on approaching it as a psychological phenomenon Rose succeeds in remaining oblivious to the obvious possibility that, as a strategy for dealing with the challenges of Jewish survival and continuity in an increasingly hostile environment, it was not less rational than its major ideological competitors in the Jewish world within which it developed.

Rose psychologises Israel’s response to the Holocaust as a case of initially suppressed trauma combined with the transfer of violent rage from the actual agent of abuse to an innocent bystander. Concerning the suppression of memory she says:

> It is not therefore talking about the Holocaust after 1967 that needs to be examined, but the fact of not – or barely – talking about it before. How could such an act of colossal denial not have the most profound effect on the birth and subsequent evolution of the fledging nation-state? (pp. 140-1).

A more appropriate question is how an assumption so radically at variance with the facts could be so casually passed off as true. Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, created in 1943,
was named after Mordechai Anilewicz, leader of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and it was dedicated to the memory of the uprising. The Ghetto Fighters’ House – Itzhak Katzenelson Holocaust and Jewish Resistance Heritage Museum was established in 1949 on Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot (the Ghetto Fighters Kibbutz), which was founded by survivors and resistance fighters. The Knesset instituted Yom Hashoah as an annual day of Holocaust remembrance in 1951. It established Yad Vashem as the national Holocaust memorial and research centre in 1953. The Eichmann trial was held in Jerusalem from April 2, 1961 until August 14, 1962, and the government used it to focus international attention on the mechanisms and the enormity of the Nazi genocide. The Israeli writer Aharon Applefeld, whose work is devoted to a literary exploration of the Holocaust, published his first three collections of stories between 1962 and 1965. It is the case that the Holocaust became an increasingly central part of public discourse in Israel over the years as awareness of its dimensions and its historical significance crystallised. However, Rose’s blithe presupposition that it was rarely discussed before 1967 has no basis in fact.

What about Rose’s claim that Israel’s political psychology and its actual policies are shaped, in no small measure, by the projection of collective shame and anger at the Holocaust, onto the Palestinians? It is certainly true that some Israeli politicians, particularly those on the right, use Holocaust rhetoric in the course of justifying lamentable policies. It is also the case that deep insecurities rooted in a fear of survival are a potent force in Israel’s political culture. However, while these anxieties have a strong historical basis, they are conditioned largely by the country’s indigenous experience of being surrounded by large numbers of hostile adversaries. Many of these have consistently formulated their rejection of its legitimacy in eliminationist terms and continue to do so. One can plausibly argue that not a small part of this hostility is generated by Israel’s aggressive conduct towards its Arab neighbours and its occupation of Palestinian territory beyond its 1967 borders. However, much of it pre-dates the acquisition of these territories and stems from Arab refusal to countenance an organised Jewish political presence of any kind in Israel/Palestine. This hostility may be understandable in historical terms. Rose may regard it as reasonable and justified. However, it is also a sufficient cause in its own right to explain many of the acute distortions and serious misjudgements that one observes in Israeli political behaviour. Oddly, Rose declines to take Arab hostility to Israel as an independent factor in the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. [17]

The radical asymmetry in Rose’s understanding of the conflict can be seen in her question, ‘What would happen if Israel could recognise its links to the people who
– whether in refugee camps on the borders (the putative Palestinian state), or inside the country (the Israeli Palestinians), or scattered, like many Jews still today, all over the world (the Palestinian diaspora) – are in fact, psychically as well as politically, in its midst?’ (pp. 101-2). This is a fair challenge, which a good number of Israelis have taken up in regularly criticising both Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories and the discrimination suffered by Israeli Arab citizens. It is interesting, however, that Rose does not trouble herself with the obvious parallel question that her query invites here. What would happen if Palestinians, and the Arab world in general recognised their connections with Israel by acknowledging its legitimacy and allowing that Israeli Jews have a natural place in the Middle East not as dhimmi (a protected but subordinated religious minority in a Muslim society) or a grudgingly (and perhaps temporarily) tolerated foreign implant, but as members of a Hebrew-speaking Semitic people with long standing historical and cultural ties to the region?

The Misrepresentation of Israeli Society

Given Rose’s professed reverence for Edward Said it is also strange to find her trapped in a thoroughly Eurocentric view of contemporary Israel. On her account, Israeli society is entirely the product of European Jewish immigrants and their neurotic reactions to persecution in Europe. The overwhelming majority of the (approximately) 850,000 Jews forced out of Middle Eastern and North African countries between 1948 and 1965 were absorbed in Israel, where they and their offspring now constitute approximately 50 percent of the Jewish population. The experiences of these people in their Arab and Muslim host countries, from which most fled as refugees, is a significant factor in determining their attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s rightwing parties in Israel successfully exploited both the social marginalisation of many Middle Eastern Jews and the deep suspicions with which some of them regard the Arab world in light of their encounters as a minority there, in order to gain support for hard line nationalist or ultra Orthodox religious agendas. Part of the populist propaganda that these parties employed in their campaigns painted supporters of the Israeli left and the peace movement as members of a European elite that dominates the economy and indulges hostile Arab interests through misguided liberal naïveté (or worse), while disregarding the concerns of deprived Middle Eastern Jewish voters. This dimension of the Israeli political scene and its role in shaping Israeli-Palestinian relations escapes any mention in Rose’s psychological parable.
Throughout the book Rose draws heavily on the writings of dissident Zionist and Israeli thinkers who have strenuously criticised official policies throughout the history of the movement and the country that it created. However, she treats this dissent as the expression of a few prophetic voices working on the margins of Israeli society.

To read these writers, alongside the dominant voices of Israeli statehood we looked at in the previous chapter, is to be confronted with something like a split between lethal identification and grievous disenchantment; as if the State of Israel were offering its citizens and the rest of the world only the options of idealisation or radical dissent. It is also to be struck with an overwhelming sense of a moment missed, of voices silenced, of an argument, at terrible cost, re-repressed. Today we are still suffering the loss of their critical, insightful, vision. (p. 107)

Even this remarkably inaccurate account of the nature of debate within Israel, and with it, any apparent concern for the consistency of her argument, is inexplicably set aside when, at the end of the book, she asks the following question concerning Israel.

How do we begin to address – we lack the vocabulary – the problem of a political identity whose strength in the world, indeed its ability to survive as an identity relies on its not being able, or willing, to question itself? (p. 152)

Given Rose’s disdain for the historical record, it is not entirely unsurprising that she should completely misrepresent the deep and ongoing arguments over fundamental issues that have engaged the mainstream of Israeli society since the earliest days of the Yishuv.

On reading her fragmentary account of Zionist binationalism one would think that Brit Shalom (and its successor, the Ichud), a small organisation of liberal intellectuals, were the only proponents of this idea. Actually, Hashomer Hatzair, the radical left kibbutz movement, was by far the largest political group supporting a binationalist programme in the years before 1948. It envisaged a joint Jewish-Arab workers state. After 1948 it continued to promote Jewish-Arab cooperation in Israel within a united labour movement. Although Hashomer Hatzair did not represent majority opinion in the country, it was far from being a marginal presence on the political scene. Mapam (the United Workers Party), the parliamentary wing
of Hashomer Hatzair, had the second largest number of seats in the first Knesset, elected in 1949, and it served as the official opposition party until the election of the second Knesset in 1951. [18]

The mainstream labour movement associated with the ruling Mapai party was riven by a major controversy between adherents of two distinct visions of Israeli foreign and domestic policy. Moshe Sharett served as Foreign Minister from 1949 until 1954, and Prime Minister from 1954 until 1955. He conducted an extended and often bitter struggle with Ben Gurion for moderate, liberal policies against Ben Gurion’s more aggressive positions. [19] Sharett sought to situate Israel firmly in the camp of non-aligned nations in Asia and Africa, avoiding alliance with either the US or the Soviet Union. This view prevailed until the mid-1950s, when Soviet diplomatic and military support for revolutionary Arab regimes forced a move towards the United States. Sharett pursued peace initiatives with Arab countries and supported the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel both before and immediately after the 1948 war. He favoured a more flexible line on the Palestinian refugees. From the early 1950s he urged the lifting of the military administration on Israel’s Arab citizens and the adoption of a liberal constitution with a charter of individual rights. Throughout the early 1950s Sharett successfully maintained a coalition of moderate political forces including the Mizrachi, the General Zionists, and Mapam to restrain Ben Gurion’s military initiatives. He opposed the campaign of retaliatory border raids against targets in Jordan and Egypt, and he did his utmost to block Ben Gurion and Dayan’s plans for the 1956 Sinai Campaign. After he was ousted from the Foreign Ministry by Ben Gurion immediately before this Campaign, he led a vocal opposition to Ben Gurion’s hawkish coalition. This produced a split in Mapai that (in conjunction with the Lavon affair) eventually led to Ben Gurion’s departure from the party in 1965 and his formation of Rafi, together with his allies, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres.

Sharett was a disciple of the socialist Zionist leader Chaim Arlozoroff and a close associate of Chaim Weizmann, for whom he served as deputy in the 1940s. His conflict with Ben Gurion over basic issues of policy dates from the pre-State period. The influence of the Sharett tradition in the mainstream of the Israeli labour movement is evident in the career of Aryieh Eliav, the Secretary General of the Israeli Labour Party in the 1960s, who, immediately after the 1967 war, came out strongly against the occupation of Palestinian territory beyond the 1967 borders. In the 1970s he formed a peace party that called for a two-state solution and pioneered contacts with the PLO. He was followed by others like Shulamit Aloni,
Yossi Sarid, and Yossi Beilin, all of whom started out as prominent figures in the Labour Party. Rose takes no notice of the fact that the Israeli peace movement has its roots in a venerable tradition of dissent within the labour movement that dates from the beginnings of this movement in the Yishuv.

The Israeli literary scene has long been a cauldron of intense argument over every aspect of Israel's history and politics. In 1949 the novelist S. Yizhar, who was a Mapai Member of Knesset until 1967, published his story ‘Hirbet Hizah’ in which he describes the expulsion of the residents of a fictional Palestinian village during the 1948 war. The story focuses on the moral problems posed by the war and the refugees that it created, a theme which runs through much of Yizhar’s work. It was included in the Israeli high school Hebrew literature curriculum in 1964. A film based on ‘Hirbet Hizah’ was shown on Israeli television in 1978, and its screening ignited heated public controversy.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the playwright Hanoch Levine wrote stinging satires on militarism in Israeli society. His play Queen of the Bathtub ridiculed the country’s deferential attitude towards the army and caused a scandal when it was produced by the Cameri Theatre in 1970. Yehoshua Sobel, a leading playwright and co-manager of the Haifa Municipal Theatre during the 1980s, has written and produced a barrage of political plays devoted to topics like the situation of Arabs in Israel, the corrupting effects of Israel’s military and political actions, the oppression of Palestinians under occupation, and the role of Jewish and Zionist history in creating the anomalies of Israeli life.

Novelists and short story writers like A.B. Yehushua, Sami Michael, Amos Oz, David Grossman, Orly Castel-Bloom, and Yoram Kaniuk have created a vibrant literature in which questions concerning the nature of Israeli identity and the social order within which it has emerged are relentlessly explored. These writers have generally identified with the political left, and they have frequently taken strong public positions against government policy.

Nor is criticism limited to politicians and intellectuals. After Christian Phalangist forces massacred hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in September, 1982, approximately 400,000 Israelis, 10 percent of the population of the country, demonstrated in Tel Aviv on September 25, 1982 against the complicity of the Israeli government (particularly defence minister Ariel Sharon) in allowing this atrocity to take place.
Rose passes over the relative absence of comparable debate and protest among Palestinians. Instead she suggests a non-existent symmetry. ‘There are suicide bombings in which Israeli children have died, rightly condemned not just by many inside Israel, but also by Palestinians, as unacceptable crimes.’ (pp. 142-43) This remark is, at best, disingenuous. It disregards the veneration accorded to suicide bombers in large sections of Palestinian society. It also suppresses the unfortunate fact that, with several honourable exceptions, Palestinian critics of these actions have generally refrained from expressing moral indignation at the murder of civilians, but chosen to focus on the damage that they do to Palestinian political interests.

Rose’s insistence on the lack of self-criticism and dissent within the centre of Israeli culture betrays the deep innocence of the facts that animates her book. Even a casual glance at the historical record and the current reality of the country reveals that it is difficult to find another society so intensely obsessed with perpetual self-examination and so inhospitable to any sort of political consensus.

**Competing National Histories and Distortion of the Facts**

Israel and the Palestinians have each cultivated official versions of their histories that sanitise their respective roles in creating the tragedy of the Palestinian refugee problem in 1948. On the official Israeli account, the Palestinians were urged by invading Arab armies to leave in order to facilitate their military assault on the Yishuv, and most fled on their own initiative. The Palestinians insist that Israel planned and implemented a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing to expel as many Palestinians as possible from the borders of the new country. In the past twenty years a new generation of Israeli historians has used recently declassified government documents to show that the traditional Israeli description of events is seriously inaccurate. Benny Morris’ research has been particularly influential in contributing to a revised understanding of the conditions under which the refugees were forced from their homes. [20]

Rose invokes Morris’ work to support a variant of the Palestinian description of the 1948 war (see pp. 134-7). In so doing she seriously distorts his conclusions. Morris is at pains to show that while, in contrast to previous Israeli claims, large numbers of Palestinians were indeed expelled, this was not the result of an official government policy of transfer. The expulsions were local tactical actions that the Hagana took in the context of a war.
Morris has recently summarised and clarified his views in a reply to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. [21]

...in 1947-1948 the Palestinian Arabs, supported by the surrounding Arab world, rebelled against the U.N. partition resolution and unleashed a bloody civil war, which was followed by a pan-Arab invasion. The war resulted in a large, partial transfer of population. The chaos that all had foreseen if Palestine were partitioned without an orderly population transfer in fact enveloped the country. But this is emphatically not to say, as Mearsheimer and Walt do, that the Zionists’ occasional ruminations about transfer were translated in 1947-1948 into an overall plan and policy – unleashed, as they put it, when the “opportunity came,” as if what occurred in 1948 was a general and premeditated expulsion.

The Zionist leadership accepted the partition plan, which provided for a Jewish state in 55 percent of Palestine with 550,000 Jews and between 400,000 and 500,000 Arabs. The Jewish Agency called on the Arabs to desist from violence, and promised a life of beneficial co-existence. In private, Zionist officials began planning agricultural and regional development that took into account the large Arab minority and its continued citizenship in the new Jewish state. Indeed, down to the end of March 1948, after four months of the Palestinian Arab assault on the Yishuv, backed by the Arab League, Zionist policy was geared to the establishment of a Jewish state with a large Arab minority. Haganah policy throughout these months was to remain on the defensive, to avoid hitting civilians, and generally to refrain from spreading the conflagration to parts of Palestine still untouched by warfare. Indeed, on March 24, 1948, Yisrael Galili, the head of the Haganah National Command, the political leadership of the organisation, issued a secret blanket directive to all brigades and units to abide by long-standing official Zionist policy toward the Arab communities in the territory of the emergent Jewish state – to secure ‘the full rights, needs, and freedom of the Arabs in the Hebrew state without discrimination’ and to strive for ‘co-existence with freedom and respect,’ as he put it. And this was not a document devised for Western or U.N. eyes, with a propagandistic purpose; it was a secret, blanket, internal operational directive, in Hebrew.

It was only at the start of April, with its back to the wall (much of the Yishuv, in particular Jewish Jerusalem, was being strangled by Arab ambushes along
the roads) and facing the prospect of pan-Arab invasion six weeks hence, that the Haganah changed its strategy and went over to the offensive, and began uprooting Palestinian communities, unsystematically and without a general policy. Needless to say, the invasion by the combined armies of the Arab states on May 15 only hardened Yishuv hearts toward the Palestinians who had summoned the invaders, whose declared purpose – as Azzam Pasha, the secretary-general of the Arab League, put it - was to re-enact a Mongol-like massacre, or, as others said, to drive the Jews into the sea. And yet Israel never adopted a general policy of expulsion (or incarceration – as did the United States in its internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, without being under direct existential threat), which accounts for the fact that 160,000 Arabs remained in Israel and became citizens in 1949. They accounted for more than 15 percent of the country’s population.

From Mearsheimer and Walt, you would never suspect that the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem in 1948 occurred against the backdrop, and as the result, of a war – a war that for the Jews was a matter of survival, and which those same Palestinians and their Arab brothers had launched. To omit this historical background is bad history – and stark dishonesty.’ [22]

Israeli public understanding of the Palestinian problem has evolved over the years. Many Israelis have come to recognise that the creation of Israel inflicted dispossession and injustice on large numbers of innocent Palestinians. They have gradually if reluctantly realised that Israel bears an important part of the responsibility for this tragedy. They accept that the Palestinian people are entitled to political independence in their own state in Palestine, which will be able to rehabilitate the refugees, and that these refugees must be compensated for the loss of land and property which they suffered.

By contrast, no significant element of Palestinian public opinion has ever challenged the cherished myths of the Palestinian national narrative. The role of its leadership’s violent rejectionism in producing the refugee problem has never been subjected to critical analysis, and Palestinian historians have yet to attempt a revisionist study of their own history. Rose misappropriates Morris’ detailed and balanced research to buy into this narrative without bothering to take account of the complex set of facts that he highlights.
Conclusion

The Question of Zion is an embarrassingly bad book. It is illiterate in basic matters of fact and devoid of rigorous argument. It is inept in its reliance on pieties to address difficult historical issues, and it occasionally teeters on incoherence in its feeble efforts at collective psychological analysis. That a reputable university press has seen fit to publish a book of this quality raises disturbing questions concerning the suspension of normal scholarly standards in deference to commercial and political considerations in academic publishing. The fact that The Question of Zion has been hailed as a work of importance in some quarters of the British press is testimony to the severely degraded level of discussion of the contemporary Middle East that afflicts significant regions of public discourse in this country.

Perhaps Freud’s greatest contribution to the study of the human mind is his naturalisation of what had previously been regarded as its dark forces. He banished the demonisation of these phenomena, insisting that they be rationally accommodated within our understanding of the psyche. It is, then, peculiar to find a book that purports to apply Freudian insights to an intractable dispute trading so easily in the fashionable demonology that casts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Manichean terms of a struggle between an irredeemably brutal Israeli oppressor and an incorruptibly innocent Palestinian victim.

In a rare moment of lucidity Rose comments on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians under occupation: ‘Today we know, from Abu Ghraib in Iraq to Bagram in Afghanistan, that this is the standard behaviour of occupying armies.’ (p. 143) Rather than building on the reasonable, if obvious remark that it is the structural relation of occupation that produces brutality rather than inherent evil in the occupier or moral purity in the occupied, she immediately cancels her own insight in the following sentence: ‘In the case of Israel, such behaviour – of an army that can neither justify nor live with itself – reveals another historical layer, another undercurrent of memory and brutally repudiated pain.’ So Israel’s occupation is, after all, the expression of a deep malady of its collective soul rather than just a misconceived set of actions, like those that the United States and Britain are committing in Iraq. Unlike the latter, it reveals an intrinsic anomaly in the agent of occupation.

Surely it is time to demystify this conflict, and to recognise it as a maddening clash of two long-suffering peoples, both of whom have justice on their side. If they are ever to extricate themselves from the hopeless embrace of enmity in which they
have trapped themselves, then each must come to fully appreciate its own role in causing the disaster they have brought upon each other and to accept the basic legitimacy of the other side, which cannot be eliminated, denied, or subordinated. To sustain such a view requires discarding the severe confusions and misjudgements that litter this book.

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**Notes**

[1] I am grateful to Daniel Burston, David Cesarani, Ariel Cohen, Mitchell Cohen, Aviva Freedman, Norm Geras, Raimond Gaita, Eve Garrard, Jonathan Ginzburg, David Hirsh, Anthony Julius, Ed Kaplan, Menachem Kellner, Daniel Lappin, Seymour Mayne, Rory Miller, Anita Mittwoch, Colin Shindler, and John Strawson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review. I bear sole responsibility for the views presented in this article and any errors that it may contain.

[2] I am grateful to Colin Shindler for pointing out this misdating of Jabotinsky’s statement.


[5] M. Garvey, in A. Garvey ed, (1986) [1923]. Garvey was the founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League. In the 1920s and 1930s he advocated the large scale immigration of African Americans to Liberia, which had been established in the mid-nineteenth century as a homeland for freed American slaves. The African American settlers were frequently resisted by the indigenous African population who saw them as encroaching on their territory. Garvey envisaged a liberated Africa to which Africans in diaspora would return. There are obvious parallels between his movement and Zionism.


[10] Rabbi Kook refrained from joining either the Agudah or the Mizrachi, and was critical of both their positions. He saw Zionist settlement as a phase in the messianic process but rejected political Zionism as an inherently secular movement. See Luz (1988), pp. 238-41.


[15] Quoted in Pawel (1990), p. 456. Pawel notes that Freud may have sent his book to Herzl in the hope of having it reviewed in Herzl’s paper, the *Neue Freie Press*. He also observes that the rise of virulent anti-Semitism in turn of the century Vienna, as signalled by the election of Karl Lueger as Mayor, caused Jewish professionals, who had previously dismissed Herzl as a crank, to take him seriously. Freud’s letter seems to reflect this development.
[16] *Freudiana* (1973), no. 20. Quoted in Yeushalmi (1991) p. 12. Nor was Freud reacting only to the Nazi regime and the threat that it posed. See Yeushalmi pp. 41-50 for a well documented discussion of Freud’s response to the anti-Semitism of several of his colleagues and the role that this issue played in his break with Jung.

[17] Rose invokes Israeli writer David Grossman’s work to argue for her claim that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is a direct expression of the unresolved trauma of the Nazi genocide (pp. 138-9). She again enlists Grossman in support of this assertion in a recent debate with Frederic Raphael in the May 25, 2006 issue of the *Times Literary Supplement*. In a reply to Rose, Grossman (2006) objects strongly to her view and to what he regards as her distortion of his work. He writes, ‘Without entering into the debate between Jacqueline Rose and Frederic Raphael, I would like to make clear that Ms Rose made tendentious and manipulative use of my 1995 article to prove her case. I never wrote that there is a direct connection between native Israelis’ attitudes towards Holocaust survivors and their attitudes today towards the Palestinians. I did not write any such thing, because I do not believe it. In my view, these two tragic sets of relations have entirely distinct causes. Linking them in the way Jacqueline Rose does in her letter is one-dimensional and misleading.’ I am grateful to Menachem Kellner for bringing Grossman’s letter to my attention.

[18] Mapam had 20 of 120 Members of Knesset in the 1949 elections (elections results are available from the Knesset website at http://www.gov.il/FirstGov/TopNavEng/EngSubjects/EngSElections/EngSEKnessets/EngSE1-4/.) It was a Marxist Zionist party that identified closely with the Soviet Union even during Stalin’s purges, the doctors trials in Moscow, and the Slansky trials in Prague. After 1956 it abandoned its pro-Soviet Marxist views and evolved into a leftwing social democratic party.


