Jacqueline Rose’s *The Last Resistance* is a fascinating, erudite, often dense, frequently insightful work. It is a collection of Rose’s recent public addresses and occasional writings, from periodicals such as the *London Review of Books* and the *New York Review of Books*, on a cluster of topics to do with psychoanalysis, Jewishness, Zionism, the legacy of the Holocaust and the power of literature. There are three outstanding pieces: ‘Born Jewish,’ on the great Belgian socialist, Marcel Liebman, [1] ‘Continuing the Dialogue,’ on the late Edward Said, [2] and ‘On Gillian Rose,’ a moving tribute to her sister. [3]

It contains some nice prose – for example: ‘When [David] Grossman uncovers the wounds of the Jewish psyche, he reveals scar tissue which, as it hardens, will not let the nation breathe.’ (p. 115) Its style – frequently because of the orally delivered origins of the collected texts – is marked by ellipses, m-dashes, asides, fragmentary non-sentences; this means the meaning often slips through your fingers. This is both good and bad: bad because it can be difficult to get Rose’s point, but good because the topics, and thus the arguments, are complex, difficult, and it is only right that the reader should work hard.

The book makes a claim towards some kind of coherence as a publication, but it is extremely uneven: there is a great deal of repetition, and some of the themes that fade in and out are left frustratingly un-developed. Not enough effort was made to edit the disparate pieces into one book. There are other marks of the occasional origin of the texts too, such as name-dropping of famous friends and relatives. [4]

I.

The ‘last resistance’ of the title refers simultaneously to ‘good’ resistance, resistance to domination, as with the French Maquis during the war, *and* to resistance in the psychoanalytical sense, resistance as a ‘bad’ thing. One of the central claims of the book is the efficacy of psychoanalytic theory for understanding political phenomena, and particularly nationalism. Rose makes a convincing case for Freud’s works on collective psychology, and the essays on this topic are important: ‘The
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_Last Resistance_ on Freud’s correspondence with Arnold Zweig, [5] and ‘Mass Psychology’ on Freud’s writings on nationalism and the collective psyche. [6]

A number of Freud’s categories are deployed skilfully, in particular to understand the Zionist variety of nationalism – to some extent addressing one of the critiques levelled at Rose by Shalom Lappin in his review here of Rose’s previous book, namely that ‘Rose’s project of subjecting a political movement and the collectivity within which it developed to psychoanalysis is seriously misconceived in that it lacks any clear basis in the analytic methods that Freud applied to individuals’ (2006). The Freudian concepts Rose deploys here – resistance, displacement, identification, investment, the uncanny – indeed provide a set of powerful tools for analysing nationalist movements.

Rose never claims that psychoanalysis alone can explain such movements; clearly, such explanations must work alongside other determinations, political, economic, social and cultural. However, at times, there seemed to me a somewhat hubristic overstatement of psychoanalysis’ moral value. In one confusing passage, for instance, Rose compares the figure of Rachel Corrie and her resistance to the Israeli Defence Forces to psychoanalysis as resistance ‘to the powers that be.’ (p. 34)

More seriously, while Rose is convincing on the value of psychoanalytic concepts, the central question of who is the subject of mass psychology remains unclear. Freud’s analysis works when he shows how particular processes – resistance, displacement, etc – work at the level of the individual, but on a mass scale, to bind people to the nation; they are more questionable when he talks of a collective or mass _subject_. Rose rightly disparages some of Freud’s elitist comments about ‘the masses’ (_die Massen_), but when subjecting the collective of the nation to analysis, traces of this elitism remain. The case for the nation as a collective subject is not made.

This allows her text to slip into forms of essentialism that are at best intellectually dubious, such as the very concept of ‘the Jewish psyche’ in the quote with which I started this review. The American forces’ use of certain forms of torture in Iraq, was justified by the use of a pseudo-scholarly work, _The Arab Mind_ (1973) by Raphael Patai, a Hungarian-born cultural anthropologist. [7] It is clear that the very concept of _the_ Arab mind is racist; surely the very concept of _the_ Jewish psyche is equally so? Are there not also many Jewish psyches? Or, at the very least, is not ‘the’ Jewish psyche more heterogeneous than her account allows? The application
of psychoanalysis to collectivities, then, risks racialising by essentialising: creating a singular collectivity where in fact there are many radically different subjects.

Interestingly, while invoking the national psyche of the Jews, the Israelis and, occasionally, the Americans, Rose does not raise the question about whether one can speak of the Palestinian psyche. Can Palestinian nationalism be subjected to the same critique and analysis to which Jewish nationalism is subjected here?

Rose quotes Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Israeli philosopher and – as she puts it – ‘dissident’: ‘Fortunate is the people whose conception of its tie to its country is recognised by others, for should this connection be contested, no legal argument could establish it.’ (p. 44) She quotes David Grossman along similar lines: ‘The Jewish majority’s explicit desire to retain its numerical superiority...is one that, when it comes down it, beats in the heart of every nation.’ (p. 119) This is a profound and important point, worth thinking through a little more carefully than Rose does. It relates to a central aporia in the book: are Freud’s critiques of nationalism relevant to all nationalisms, or to Zionism alone? Any account which undermines the ground on which nationalism in general stands, by definition also undermines the ground on which specific nationalisms stand, yet The Last Resistance draws back from – resists, one might say – any questioning of Palestinian nationalism. Although Freud’s wisdom lay in identifying generic features of modernity, including the dangers of generic nationalism, the single nationalism that the book returns to again and again in Part I and Part III is the same one with which her previous book, The Question of Zion, was concerned: Jewish nationalism. [8]

More specifically, the question to which she returns here is that of the relationship between Zionism and the Holocaust. There are two mythic narratives that draw a line from Nazi Germany to Zionist Israel. The first is the redemptive Zionist narrative of the Jewish nation as an eternally persecuted people which barely survived the Final Solution, for whom only an independent state in their national home, the land of Israel, can provide a truly safe refuge. The second is the anti-Zionist obverse of this narrative: that, having been persecuted themselves, the Jewish people were given statehood by a guilt-ridden West, where they ironically proceeded to oppress others as they themselves were once oppressed. Rose rightly deconstructs and destabilises the first narrative, but leaves the second intact. [9]

Indeed, she perpetuates the second myth: she describes the ‘the Jews’ as being in danger of ‘transporting their own legacy of displacement, directly and perilously,
This claim is problematic in three ways. First, it essentialises Jews: again figured as the Jews. Second, it reduces a complex story – which, for instance, includes Jews moving to Israel from many lands (some scarred by the Holocaust, others not), which includes the complicity of some Arabs in Nazism and the involvement of some others in helping Jews to escape the Final Solution, which includes the many positions within the Zionist movement on the form a Jewish national home might take, which includes the geopolitical context in which the Jewish state was created – into a simple story: the Shoah ‘directly’ transported onto the soil of Palestine. Third, it sets up a false equation between the Shoah and the Nakba, two tragedies which are each unique.

One of the problems with Rose’s account of Zionism, and with the straight line she draws from the Shoah to the Zionist state, is that it ends up treating Zionism as one thing, as a wholly coherent, unified, empirical reality. But Zionism has always been, and remains, a heterogeneous phenomenon: an idea, a mass movement, a state – or, rather, a cluster of ideas (some contradictory), a diverse movement, a hybrid state. Related, then, to the question of whether Freud’s critique of nationalism is applicable to all nationalisms (including Arab nationalisms) is the question of whether Rose’s critique is of Zionism as such, or only one version of Zionism. Often in the book, Rose offers a critique of all Zionism, of Zionism as such.

This line of critique falls down at a number of places but is perhaps most clearly exemplified by her description of Martin Buber, Hans Kohn, Hannah Arendt and Ahad Ha’am as ‘critics of Zionism’ (2006a, p. 4). As these people were obviously and unambiguously Zionists, however, this only makes sense if we think of them as critics of one version of Zionism, of a dominant strand of Zionism (an analogy would be calling Trotsky a ‘critic of Marxism’ because he was a critic of Stalin). There have been many Zionisms, and only some are open to Rose’s critique. But to account for this would undermine the notion of an Israeli psyche, a Jewish psyche, a singular Zionist national imaginary.

At other times, she critiques a dominant tradition of Zionism, suggesting that another Zionism is possible. [10] This second line of inquiry is more fruitful precisely because it does justice to the heterogeneity of Zionism as it has actually existed. Thus, Rose asks, ‘Can you be a non-Zionist Zionist? [David] Grossman, I think, comes close.’ (p. 121) Elsewhere, she suggests that critical Zionists – Buber, Kohn, Arendt and Ha’am – exemplify the possibility of ‘Zionism’s self-knowledge.’ (p. 198) Similarly, in her discussion of Freud, she writes that he makes ‘the most
careful and resonant distinction between two ways of being in the world, indeed between two forms of Zionism... One which, living in the real world, quietly and soberly works to achieve its ends (the University of Jerusalem,... the agricultural work of the immigrants); the other which, recognising no obstacles, ruthlessly sweeps across the earth and its people.’ (p. 49) Who are we to say which is the one and only authentic Zionism, that Herut truly represented Zionism while the Hebrew University and the kibbutz didn’t? How can we say that Jabotinsky was a true Zionist but Ahad Ha-am wasn’t? Instead, in these passages, if not in the book as a whole, Rose holds out the possibility that both Zionism’s critical voices and its most strident dogmatists fall within the heterogeneous space of Zionism.

Most powerfully, in ‘The Hidden Life of Vladimir Jabotinsky,’ [11] Rose shows how Jabotinsky, the man most closely associated with the hard-line, even fascist, Revisionist current of Zionism, was a figure of doubt and humanity, who cared about Arab suffering. ‘In Jabotinsky’s writing, Zionism both affirms and doubts itself. What would Israeli look like today if the modern leaders who have claimed to take their inspiration from him – Begin, Netanyahu, Sharon and now Olmert... – had shown themselves capable of such self-questioning?’ (p. 107) But all too often, Rose shows a lack of self-questioning that mirrors theirs; Zionism is usually described in the book as a monolithic entity, with no internal critique, no diversity of programme or values.

This monolithic vision of Zionism is a version of what has been called a ‘flattening’ of Zionism in anti-racist anti-Zionist writing, a flattening which, by ironing out the doubting, humane, just dimension of Zionism, gives licence to racist forms of anti-Zionism that reduce Zionism’s complexity to the simple picture of ‘the Zionist entity.’ [12]

One element of this flattening is the figuring of Jewishness, Zionism and Israel together as essentially white, European and western. This is a feature of the anti-Zionism of that part of the ‘anti-imperialist’ left which finds common cause with Palestinian ‘resistance’ (including its suicide bombers) because of a shared hatred of the West. [13] This ‘anti-imperialist’ analysis finds its way into Rose’s work in the way that the West is always responsible for the evils of the world. For instance, in Rose’s analysis, the West is always responsible for non-Western violence against the West. On p. 127 she asserts that Israel is responsible for suicide bombing because in 1982 it ‘created the space for Hizbollah, who carried out the first suicide bombings’ and supported Hamas (against Fatah) from the late 1980s. Then, on p. 130, she
argues that ‘the West bears more than a share of responsibility’ for the child battalions of Khomeini, because it supported Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran. The question begged is, do you create suicide bombers by supporting Islamists (p. 127) or by supporting those at war with Islamists (p. 130)? The answer, clearly, is that whatever the West does is wrong.

The line that Rose draws from the Shoah to the State of Israel is the most striking example of this idea of Israel as a western or European projection. If Israel is the end of a line that starts with the Shoah, then Israel is fundamentally the outcome of a European history. The other, non-European, histories of Israel and of Jewry are flattened out of this picture.

II.

I have already mentioned Rose’s hubristic claims for psychoanalysis’ emancipatory potential. Perhaps related to this is a glorification of intellectuals and equally hubristic claims about the redemptive power of literature and criticism. Indeed, one of the arguments of the book is for the political and moral value of literature, the ‘last resistance’ of the writer to the brutality of contemporary forms of power and to ‘the orthodoxy of the nation’ (p. 13). ‘To be a literary critic... is to enter into the mind of the other, to invite and force your reader to see themselves in situations far from their own.’ (p. 193) ‘[T]he role of writing – fiction but also non-fiction – is to push you through what should be the impassable boundaries of the mind.’ (p. 10) Interestingly, while Rose is not (or not explicitly) making these claims about her own writing, on the back of the book both Avi Shlaim and Slavoj Žižek describe her as ‘a public intellectual’ (for the latter, the very ‘model of what a public intellectual should be’).

I think it is instructive to place this glorification of the figure of the intellectual (exemplified in the text by Edward Said and Sigmund Freud above all) side by side with Freud’s elitist disparagement of die Massen. Is it only the intellectual who stands outside the ‘national psyche’ that is the subject of Freud’s (and Rose’s) ‘mass psychology’ of nationalism? And, crucially, what does this mean for the possibility of emancipatory politics, and specifically an emancipatory politics in which ordinary people, and not just intellectuals, might participate? Or should politics be left to the intellectuals, as the ones who escape the orthodoxies of the masses?
Rose often talks of her pantheon of intellectuals as ‘brave’ in their resistance of these orthodoxies. Sara Roy’s blurb on the back of the book describes Rose’s book itself as a ‘work of... moral courage.’ Arendt smuggling documents to Kurt Blumenfeld’s German Zionist Organization from under Nazi noses (for which she was arrested by the Gestapo) or the young Catholic workers’ organisation that helped save Marcel Liebman’s life during the war (p. 204) were indisputably brave. But it is unclear to me what ‘moral courage’ is required to take what is after all the dominant political position amongst England’s liberal classes. [14]

Similarly, Rose deploys the image of ‘dissent’ – stifled, she asserts, since September 11. In an interview, she has said that what the intellectual has to offer is ‘dissent... It is the task of the intellectual to think thoughts, to say things, that can’t be said anywhere else.’ [15] Yet many of her figures of dissent ring hollow: Grossman is a major personality in Israel; Said’s dissent made him a globally admired and best-selling writer; Chomsky’s dissent has made him very rich.

But more importantly, this overwhelming emphasis on the dissent of intellectuals obscures the lower-key dissent of non-intellectuals. Most (almost all) of the people who took immense courage in resisting the Nazis, for example, were not intellectuals. The sheer fact of the extraordinary dissent of such ordinary people undermines the Freudian conceptualisation of die Massen, the mass subject in thrall to ‘the orthodoxy of the nation.’ In the contemporary Israeli context, this obscuring of non-intellectual dissent is politically dangerous, as it reduces critical politics to ‘the expression of a few prophetic voices working on the margins of Israeli society’ (Lappin 2006, p. 13), when, as Shalom Lappin has pointed out, critical and post-Zionist voices are at the heart of the (incredibly diverse) Israeli political sphere. [16] If this sort of dissent is obscured, the possibility of a politics of solidarity with it is blocked.

Finally, this celebration of the intellectual as a figure of dissent obscures the central role of intellectuals in generating and sustaining the brutal ‘orthodoxy of the nation,’ as in the examples of the philosophers, poets and Shakespeare scholars who led the nationalist movements of the former Yugoslavia – or, for that matter, of the immensely erudite Jabotinsky.

The political project this leads to in relation to Israel-Palestine is the academic and cultural boycott of Israel. The boycott does not engage with the resistance of ordinary people (Israeli or Palestinian) to the Occupation, but, rather, focuses on
intelectuals and the texts they produce. Ironically, however, one effect would be a silencing of the dissenting voices Rose admires, as the words of David Grossman or Shulamith Haraven would become unavailable outside Israel.

III.
Jacqueline Rose wrote the pieces in *The Last Resistance* as a Jew. ‘Calling up these voices,’ she writes of thinkers like Arendt, ‘[I am] rebuilding the legacy of my own Jewish history.’ (p. 198) What does it mean for Rose to write ‘as’ a Jew? What is the performative work done by these phrases? What does the claiming of this legacy do in her politics? The essay that opens the collection, entitled ‘The Last Resistance,’ starts with the figure of the Marrano. Marranos were Jews forcibly converted to the Catholicism under the Spanish Inquisition, yet clinging onto some notion of Jewish identity in secret. ‘The Marranos,’ Rose writes, ‘cherish their identity as something to be hoarded that also sets them irrevocably adrift. Jacques Derrida liked to compare his Jewishness with theirs, because they do not belong, while still remaining Jewish, even if they reached the point where they “no longer knew in what their Jewishness consists.”’ (p. 17)

Descendants of Marranos in Latin America are returning to Jewishness. And yet, Rose claims, there

‘is virtually no court to which they could declare their allegiance that is sure to be honoured by Israel should such a descendant decide to take what might be the logical next step and make the ancestral land of Palestine their home... they want to claim an allegiance unbound by orthodoxy, not as conversion, but one that can still perhaps bear the traces of their peculiar history – an affinity, not an identity in the custodianship of armed forces and priests.’ (p. 17, 34)

For Derrida, it was the secretness, the being under erasure, of Marrano Jewishness that appealed, a secretness that undermines belonging. In an interview, he said that ‘each time some belonging circumscribes me, if I may put it this way, someone or something cries out: Watch out, there’s a trap, you’re caught’ (Ewald 1995). ‘I have a taste for the secret,’ he wrote; ‘it clearly has to do with not belonging... Belonging – the fact of avowing one’s belonging, of putting in common – be it family, nation, tongue – spells the loss of the secret’ (2001, p. 59). At the same time, he associates Jewishness with non-belonging. Of his expulsion from school in Algeria under anti-
semitic laws, he has said: ‘thus expelled, I became the outside’ (1978, p. 289) and elsewhere that this moment led him to ‘cultivate a sort of not-belonging to French culture and to France in general, but also, in some way, to reject my belonging to Judaism... [This is the basis of my attempt to] rationalize and transform not-belonging into an ethico-political duty, saying that belonging is a non-belonging, and saying that is on the basis of non-belonging that faithfulness is constructed’ (2001:39).

I am not sure how many descendants of Marranos would recognise themselves in this description. My reading of the phenomenon of Latin Americans discovering a secret, hidden Marrano heritage is a longing for belonging, for identity; it is not the secretness of Marrano tradition that appeals to these people, so much as a desire to come out, for revelation and disclosure of that which has supposedly been repressed and kept secret: a desire to make visible what has been erased. To assertively reclaim Marrano status is an essentialist identity politics, of exactly the sort that Derrida attacks.

Rose’s identity politics veers between this sort of essentialism and Derrida’s radical anti-essentialism. ‘We are as a group a mystery,’ Freud’s friend Wulf Sachs wrote to him (quoted p. 85). The mystery of the Jews produces a peculiar politics of authenticity in Rose’s writing, in which the Marranos represent an authentic Jewishness somehow denied by the Zionist state, while converts to Judaism who declare allegiance to Israel represent an inauthenticity. (An example is ‘Displacement in Zion,’ the second essay in the collection, which opens with the figure of Maayan Yaday, a Croatian woman, formerly Catholic, who lives in a settlement in the Occupied Territories.)

Rose is drawn to Derrida, to Freud and to the Marrano – but not Maayan Yaday – as offering a form of Jewishness that does not strengthen nation-states and, crucially, does not require Jewish practices. It is a Jewishness empty of content.

Freud writes of being estranged from the religion of his fathers and the characteristics of his people. Asking himself what is there left of him that is Jewish he replies: ‘A great deal and probably its very essence’ (quoted p. 85). Rose writes: ‘Freud defines himself here as Isaac Deutscher’s non-Jewish Jew; but for all that, or even because of that, he is Jewish in essence.’ (ibid) She also describes David Grossman as a non-Jewish Jew. (p. 120). Rose also quotes the Israeli socialist and Holocaust survivor Hannah Levy-Hass, whose memoir, we are told, was given to Rose by her daughter,
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Amira Hass. “Only if their search for an identity helps Jewish intellectuals to fight for the better future for the whole of mankind,” Levy-Hass states in 1978 citing Isaac Deutscher, ‘do I regard their search as justified.” (p. 8) [17]

By calling on Jews to follow their identity only if it positively serves all humanity, as Levy-Hass does, or by romanticising the figure of the non-Jewish Jew, Rose – like Derrida – is ultimately celebrating a Jewishness that only exists under erasure. One cannot imagine Rose endorsing the idea that, for example, African-Americans or women should not search for an identity unless it positively promotes a better future for all people. In these statements, Jewish identity is rendered exceptional – much as Jewish nationalism is rendered exceptional by the Freudian analysis to which it alone is subjected.

Indeed, we can think of Deutscher’s non-Jewish Jew as a variant of the ‘exceptional Jew’ who Hannah Arendt writes about: the Jew who exemplifies an exceptional quality that allows him or her to be tolerated by the liberal majority, by ‘society’ – that is, by non-Jews. In Joan Cocks’ paraphrase of Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, the liberal Enlightenment ‘found exceptional Jews magnetic and the mass of Jews obnoxious’ (1999). [18] The exceptional Jew, such as Moses Mendelssohn, is the exemplar in the anti-Semite’s claim that some of his best friends are Jewish, the Jew who is able to claim political emancipation by virtue of having emancipated herself from Jewishness.

Rose writes that, ‘finally,’ Marcel Liebman’s appeal is for a Jewishness ‘not sealed behind walls of conviction, but open to the infinite possibilities of tomorrow.’ (p. 207) This striking phrase is attractive, but what if it is thought through ‘finally’ to some possible conclusions – an antisemitic Jewishness, for example, as has been resurgent in Israel recently? [19] Jewishness open to infinite possibilities is ‘finally’ not Jewishness.

Indeed, in many of the essays, Rose celebrates a Jewishness emptied of any positive cultural content, sundered from its specific ethical tradition. The Marranos of South America have only the most tenuous connection to this tradition despite their possible genetic descent from the Jewish people, while Maayan Yaday, the Croatian convert to Judaism (who appears as a villain in the book), has embraced the tradition but is not ‘racially’ Jewish. Thus the postmodern, anti-essentialist Jewishness Rose celebrates masks a deeper essentialism: that of ‘race.’ [20] Without
'race,' the Jewishness Rose celebrates is reduced to a few ethical banalities – or to an overwhelming attachment to (the criticism of) the state of Israel.

One chapter in *The Last Resistance*, the beautiful ‘On Gillian Rose’ which concludes the book, escapes this logic. Here, Jacqueline Rose explores the elements of the positive cultural content of Jewish tradition which her sister Gillian Rose excavated as a resource for renewing thinking. What is curiously omitted from the piece, left silent, is the fact that Gillian converted to Catholicism towards the end of her life and died, not as a Jew, but as a Christian.

By taking the Marrano, the exceptional, non-Jewish, Jew, as a positive model of Jewishness, Rose is ultimately demanding Jews to become non-Jewish: the non-Jewish Jew is by definition contrasted to the Jewish Jew. The celebration of the non-Jewish Jew is a call for the negation of Jewishness. That this is so is clear from Rose’s fascinating reading in the essay ‘Mass Psychology’ of Freud’s *Moses the Man* (written in 1938, in the face of the imminent destruction of European Jewry). She writes that, ‘Like the sixteenth-century mystical messiah Shabtai Svi, Freud can be seen as... leading his followers against the Law, into apostasy and freedom.’ (p. 81) She describes Freud as presenting the Jewish people with ‘two paths,’ a path to apostasy and freedom, away from Judaism, or the path of Yahweh, ultimately leading to the creation of the Jewish state and to the Nakba. (p. 83) Recall that Svi ultimately converted to Islam and lived out his life under the protection of the Ottoman Caliphate: the ultimate non-Jewish Jew. This negation of Jewishness, one could say, is the ultimate logic of Rose’s argument. Perhaps, however, the ‘last resistance’ hovering behind her book is the stubborn resistance of the Jews to their negation, their refusal of the path of ‘apostasy and freedom.’

Ben Gidley is a sociologist. He is the Deputy Director of the Centre for Urban and Community Research at Goldsmiths, University of London and an advisory editor of *Engage*.

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Notes
[4] Some examples: ‘[My sister] Gillian Rose, our cousin Braham Murray, artistic director of the Royal Exchange Theatre in Manchester, and myself all found our work drawn towards the

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Holocaust...’ (p. 223), ‘a conversation in which I would also want to include our other sisters, Alison Rose whose fine writing has now brought her to a film script on Theresienstadt...’ (p. 224), ‘In our exchanges Judith Butler asked me if I would address...’ (p. 219), ‘as part of the preparation for a new course I was about to start teaching at Queen Mary, ‘Palestine-Israel,’ Israel-Palestine: Politics and the Literary Imagination,’ I read...’ (p. 216). Indeed, the full name of that course is given at least four times in the book. This sort of writing acts to exclude the reader who stands outside the charmed circle conjured up, trivialises the important topics Rose tackles, and undermines the sense of a coherent argument being made across a book.


[8] To be fair, Rose, especially in Part II, does subject British and American nationalism to a similar Freudian critique. ‘Freud knew that the fierceness with which a group builds and defends its identity was the central question of modern times. But, unlike the leaders of our ‘present-day white Christian culture’ [Freud’s striking phrase], he also knows that no group is safe from the dangers of conviction, and that a nation that frees itself from doubt and refuses to question its own motives can place the whole world in peril.’ (p. 167) It is unclear whether Rose thinks the leaders of the Iranian and Palestinian nations, for example, are safer from the dangers of conviction.

[9] This is a point David Grossman has made: ‘In my view, these two tragic sets of relations have entirely distinct causes. Linking them in the way Jacqueline Rose does in her letter is one-dimensional and misleading.’ (2006)

[10] Rose makes this point well in an interview: ‘I believe that Zionism [has] incredibly creative forces running through it and a self-critique at the heart of it. I believe that other side will assert itself. So in that sense I am optimistic’ (in Sutherland, 2005).


[13] Related is the glib and facile moral equivalence that allows Rose to liken ‘Evangelical America’ to ‘fundamentalist Islam,’ both of which ‘would destroy half the world in [God’s name]’ (p. 151) or this spectacular non-sequitur, about televisual images of September 11 deaths that CNN pulled as too disturbing:

‘There is... a taboo on death in American culture... Above all a body must not be seen to die... To efface, or pre-empt, such images George Bush – with the full backing of Tony Blair – went to war against Iraq... Another way of saying, perhaps, that the greatest evil lies within ourselves.’ (p. 155)

A related feature of the book is the bathos when Rose places figures like Arendt side by side with present-day public intellectuals. ‘The strength of Arendt’s analysis is that she recognises that there is something deadly in the law’ is immediately followed by ‘Likewise Chomsky, against the dominant rhetoric on terrorism, relentlessly charts acts of Western-sanctioned state terrorism in the modern world’ (p. 146), as if Arendt’s complicated insight is comparable to Chomsky’s banal litany of America’s crimes.
These features – the flattening of Zionism, the figuring of Israel as white and western, the ‘anti-imperialist’ celebration of murderous forms of ‘resistance,’ moral equivalence, the likening of best-selling members of the contemporary commentariat to genuinely dissident intellectuals – are endemic in western liberal culture, and therefore not faults of Rose’s.

[14] Norman Geras has made a similar point, referring to a review by Peter Preston of The Last Resistance which lauds Rose’s ‘fierce shell of courage to speak out,’ which Geras describes as ‘the attribution of courage to someone who risks nothing and can count on their applause from those who like it when Jews invoke their Jewishness to criticise Israel, as if it might add authority to what they say.’ Geras notes Preston’s quotation of Rose’s quotation of Shulamith Haraven’s description of the Zionist Jew as the ‘eternal victim, alone in the world, who sits upright upon his throne with his eyes closed, smothering all other peoples (especially the Arabs)’ (Preston 2007, quoting Rose, p. 54). ‘There you go,’ writes Geras, ‘smothering Arabs and all other peoples. It takes courage to repeat such things, does it not?’ (2007)


[16] Among Lappin’s examples are the 10 percent of the Israeli population – presumably not all intellectuals – who took to the streets to protest the Sabra and Shatila massacres (2006, p. 15).

[17] Deutscher’s concept of the non-Jewish Jew (Deutscher 1981) has taken on something of an iconic status for the Independent Jewish Voices group, of which Rose is a leading figure. IJV signatories Moshe Machover and Lisa Appignanesi spoke in 2007 at the ICA at an event entitled Isaac Deutscher and the Non-Jewish Jew; Michael Kustow, another signatory, quoted Deutscher’s ‘Non-Jewish Jew’ essay in an op-ed in North London newspaper the Ham and High re-published on the IJV website (Kustow, 2008); while Mike Davis has said of another Verso-published IJV signatory, Mike Marqusee that, ‘Both in the eloquence of his writing and the deep humanism of his vision, he stands shoulder to shoulder with the spirits of Isaac Deutscher and Edward Said.’ (Verso press release at http://www.mikemarqusee.com/index.php?p=258)

[18] Julia Pascal, in an excellent short review of The Last Resistance, makes a similar point well: ‘Rose is for the idea of the super-Jew, who abandons the reality of a Jewish state in Israel because it dispossesses the Palestinian.’ (Pascal 2007, emphasis added).


[20] This was perceived by Rose’s admirer Peter Preston, who describes Rose in The Last Resistance as seeking ‘to define the nature of her race and religion’ and as ‘swim[ming] in the deepest waters of the national psyche’ (2007). See Geras 2007.