The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran—bent on regional domination, aggressive toward Israel, and hostile to the United States—is as serious a threat as the United States has confronted in recent decades. For at least two key reasons, that threat will not be directly confronted with force in the short term. First, there are genuine questions about how close Iran is to nuclear weapons capabilities. Estimates differ and are inconclusive. After the intelligence failure in Iraq, standards of proof are high, and policymakers in Washington and in capitals abroad will demand more certainty before taking aggressive action. Second, U.S. military capabilities, regional influence, and diplomatic leverage are effectively reduced by the grinding conflict in Iraq, making the prospect of a second simultaneous conflagration in the Middle East both politically and militarily untenable.

For now, containing the threat posed by Iran will center on diplomatic measures aimed at dissuading the Iranian regime from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, sustaining international unity in opposition to Tehran’s weapons program, and preventing escalation of the conflict to a point where force is the sole remaining option. The policy will amount to a carefully calibrated, hands-on holding pattern designed to draw out the problem to a point where it can be solved diplomatically and politically or where circumstances have changed to make the use of force feasible.

In this context, questions will arise about whether Washington is right to refuse direct talks with the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Current U.S. policy is that as long as Tehran declines to suspend uranium enrichment, direct talks are off-limits. The reasons for spurning face-to-face negotiations are clear enough. Ahmadinejad is a sworn enemy of Israel and a Holocaust denier. He has thumbed his nose at serious offers by the United States, Europe, China, and Russia to strike a bargain for economic and political rewards in return for nuclear safeguards. In engaging directly with such a leader, the United States risks dignifying and publicizing his cause. Ahmadinejad seems bent on positioning Iran as a power with global stature, and going toe-to-toe with Washington could advance that aspiration. There’s also little to suggest that direct talks between countries with competing worldviews and strategic objectives will bear fruit. After all, the United States and Iran do communicate regularly through foreign intermediaries and the media, such that each knows the other’s bottom line. Talking to Tehran is neither a solution to the crisis in itself, nor is it particularly likely to lead to one.

Although talking to Tehran will not end the brewing nuclear standoff, it could advance Washington’s goal of keeping a lid on it long enough for more appealing policy alternatives to ripen. The United States would not need to change its position on the acceptability of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, but rather agree simply to meet with no strings attached or concessions implied. Rather than singling out Iran, this should be done as part of a broader shift toward willingness to talk to just about any nation on matters of mutual concern.

The current refusal of the United States to talk directly to Iran, North Korea, and others allows these regimes to paint the United States as the obstacle to diplomacy, feeding perceptions that it is unilateralist and lacks respect for the views of others. A reversal of this policy would yield the opposite effect—countering perceptions of U.S. arrogance and intransigence. A blanket policy of willingness to meet bilaterally with any nation and without preconditions would blunt the perception that, in particular situations, willingness to talk reflects a weakening of the U.S. position. We would talk not because we thought talks would be fruitful, or because we necessarily credit what the other party would say, but rather because we followed a policy of readiness to hear others out, regardless of the repugnance of their views.

Agreeing to talk does not mean agreeing to talk endlessly. If talks prove unproductive, having done its part and made a genuine attempt at fruitful discussions, the United States is justified in walking away.

Although the Bush administration has on occasion resisted direct talks, claiming that they risk undermining multiparty negotiations underway, there’s no contradiction between bilateral talks and multilateral diplomacy. All effective multilateral negotiation processes are filled with bilateral sidebars, where much of the hard work happens. UN representatives spend much of their time in one-on-one discussions with other delegations. Because of their freewheeling and private character, such sessions can jostle loose ostensibly rigid positions. Even where no common ground is found, direct talks can expose vulnerabilities and motivations in ways that are easier to hide in more public forums.

Assuming Iran marches toward nuclear weapons development, but confrontation is deferred to a time when intelligence estimates are more conclusive and Washington is militarily and politically more up to the task of confrontation, attention at home and abroad will inevitably turn to whether means short of force were fully exhausted. By talking to Tehran now, Washington can pave the way for both domestic and international support in the event that the time for talks ultimately runs out.

Suzanne Nossel is a senior fellow at the Security and Peace Institute, a joint initiative of the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation, and a founder of the democracyarsenal.org weblog.

Read other responses: Shlomo Avineri, Michael W. Doyle, Yitzhak Nakash, Anne-Marie Slaughter.

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