What is required in Iran’s case is a psychological breakthrough between Washington and Tehran, an engagement of Iranian leaders over a range of issues—and a new strategy of deterrence in the event Iran develops a bomb. A U.S. policy based on carrots and sticks would be more effective in managing Iran’s growing power in the Middle East as well as its regional and nuclear ambitions.
Iran today is very different from the embattled Islamic Republic of the early 1980s, with a widespread women’s movement and a young generation of educated Iranians clamoring for reform and greater contacts with the West. The hard-liners in Tehran know that they will not benefit from a full-scale civil war in Iraq, which could destabilize the Persian Gulf and undermine Iran’s interests in the region. Hence they may be receptive to a détente with America in exchange for a grand bargain. If there is to be a deal with the current regime, it will have to be made not only with the reformers, but also with the more powerful conservative politicians and clerics in Iran.
This reality should not be obscured by the unfortunate denial of the Holocaust by Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or by his outrageous statements that Israel should be wiped off the map—rhetoric that allowed him to occupy center stage in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad is not a messianic madman. Nor is he a Shiite version of Saddam Hussein, who launched two devastating wars in the Persian Gulf in the name of Arabism, or of Osama bin Laden, who declared jihad against America and the West in the name of Islam. Instead, he is a radical populist who has allied himself with a coalition of third world leaders, including Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, all of whom have capitalized on the general resentment against the world’s strongest power in the non-Western world. Ahmadinejad’s government may yet turn out to be the least religious in orientation that Iran has had since the start of the revolution. And should his socioeconomic policies fail to improve the living conditions of the poor classes in Iran, whose members voted for him overwhelmingly in 2005, he could lose office in the next elections.
Washington and Tehran would need to acknowledge the mistakes of the past and begin a dialogue intended, on our side, to encourage Iran to play a positive role in the U.S. effort to bring stability to Iraq and the larger Middle East. The need for a dialogue has become all the more pressing because of the recent vote by the Iraqi Parliament to approve the creation of autonomous regions—which could worsen sectarian and ethnic conflicts in Iraq and lead to the creation of a predominantly Shiite region uniting the nine provinces of southern Iraq.
Imagine the impact in Iran of a public announcement by the Bush administration that regime change is off the table, provided Iran accounts for its nuclear program, stops its support for terrorism, and acknowledges the right of all Middle Eastern states to exist in peace. Such an announcement, accompanied by an offer for improved political and economic relations and student exchanges with Iran, could put Ahmadinejad and the hard-line clerics on the defensive; enable the United States to build bridges to the reformers, the harbingers of any political change in Iran; and better contain Iran’s influence in the Middle East and its pursuit of nuclear capability. Improved U.S.-Iranian relations, moreover, will also weaken Syria and Hezbollah and in the long run could increase the prospects of peace between Israel and Syria and Lebanon.
In order to succeed, this policy will require the United States to develop robust means of deterrence that carry the threat of unbearable consequences to Iran in the event it succeeds in developing a bomb and attempts to use it. Should Iran reject a U.S. offer made in good faith for improved relations, there would be far greater international support for tough action against the regime in Tehran.
The rise of the Shia in the wake of the war in Iraq has coincided with increased violence in the Middle East. Although the war has resulted in unprecedented loss of U.S. credibility in the international arena, the outcome thus far suggests that Iran stands to lose from chaos in Iraq and further conflict in the Middle East. Both countries therefore have an incentive to seek a détente. A deal would help the United States to improve its standing in the world, and reassert its supremacy as a global power, and would allow Iran to assume the role of a power in the Persian Gulf committed to stability in the region. The price of confrontation may be too high for both countries, and the potential dividends of a deal too tempting to ignore.
Yitzhak Nakash is currently a Carnegie Corporation Scholar. He is the author of Reaching for Power: The Shi‘a in the Modern Arab World.
Read other responses: Shlomo Avineri, Michael W. Doyle, Suzanne Nossel, Anne-Marie Slaughter.
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